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ABSTRACT
Like all Americans, the Native peoples were swept into the crucible that
was the Civil War.

Although under no obligation to participate in the

conflagration, many Indian tribes joined one side, some even both factions. The
Catawba peoples of South Carolina were, among these, fully committing to the
Confederacy.

That seemingly contradictory response in the light of their

treatment by South Carolina is the subject of this thesis.
Before examining their Civil War response, the Introduction traces their
relationship with the white colonists of Carolina from its founding in 1670
through the end of the American Revolution. With this background, the direct
antebellum period is explored in Chapter I, especially the watershed Nations Ford
Treaty. The Civil War itself and its military and homeland effects on Catawbas is
the subject of Chapter II. Finally, the changes or continuity as a result of this
experience are examined in Chapter III. At each stage the responses of the other
Southeastern Indians to the same circumstances are historiographically reviewed,
especially to attempt an understanding of what motivated the Catawbas’ unique
response to the Civil War and the consequences of that choice.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis will explore why the Catawba Indians, a small tribe native to
South Carolina, supported and even fought and died for the Confederate States of
America in the Civil War. At casual glance, this is essentially a non-question;
they were residents of that state, and the Confederacy was overwhelmingly
embraced by South Carolinians regardless of whether they owned slaves or not.
But when one considers the Catawba Nation’s contributions to South Carolina
and the treatment they received in response to their loyalty, the obvious answer
fades into a study of the complex racial, social, and economic dynamics of the
antebellum South.
Specifically, this thesis will argue that the primary motivation for the
Catawbas’ Confederate military service resulted from the biracial society that was
thrust upon them after 1800. This Indian nation was the third racial group in that
explosive mix, and how they reacted to those circumstances is the history and
connection this paper will relate.
Much has been written about black slaves and white planters and farmers,
the two prominent groups in the plantation economy of the colonial and
antebellum South. Yet historical research remains an evolving effort, and in the
American South it has expanded to include other groups:

women, children,

immigrants, and frontier pioneers all lived within this overarching biracial
framework, as did the Indians.
Within the history of the Indians, the Catawbas of South Carolina appear
to have endured a unique experience.

The vast majority of native peoples

originally in the South have vanished.

Some tribes, like the Westo and the

PeeDee, became extinct, the victims of disease and war. Others moved from the

area. The Tuscarora ended up in New York, the Savannahs shifted to the Ohio
Valley. Others—the Five Civilized Tribes—were forcibly moved west.
The Catawba people stayed (or alternatively were trapped) in South
Carolina, the epicenter of the sectional struggles that culminated in the Civil War.
Their response of unconditional, unwavering support of the Confederate ideals
was not a given however.
Historians have given different interpretations as to why the Catawbas
joined South Carolina in the Confederate cause. Still, no one has specifically seen
the Catawbas’ racial quandary as the primary, overriding motivation. A brief
review of the historiography is in order.
Douglas Summer Brown published the first comprehensive studies of the
Catawba people. Her 1953 A City Without Cobwebs related the history of Rock
Hill, South Carolina, the ancestral home of the Catawbas. 1 In an early chapter,
Brown discusses the tribe and its relations with the white settlers through 1840.
In 1966, she published The Catawba Indians—People of the River, the first
comprehensive study of the Catawba people, which is considered the classic
standard by Catawba historians. 2 Its detailed examination of Catawba history
devotes only three paragraphs to their Civil War experience. She argues that
white coercion was the cause of Catawba participation in the war. Chapman J.
Milling in his 1969 study of the Catawbas, Red Carolinians, writes only one
sentence about the Civil War and does not attempt any explanation of their
possible motivations. 3

Charles M. Hudson in The Catawba Nation (1970)

presents an anthropologic study of the Catawbas.4 He mentions their Civil War
1

Douglas Summers Brown, A City Without Cobwebs-A History of Rock Hill, South Carolina
(Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1953).
2
Douglas Summers Brown, The Catawba Indians-People of the River (Columbia: The University
of South Carolina Press, 1966).
3
Chapman J. Milling, Red Carolinians (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1969).
4
Charles M. Hudson, The Catawba Nation (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1970).
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experience briefly on only two occasions. Significantly, he attempts to place this
chapter of the nation’s history in the context of their place and role in antebellum
Southern society, finding them an increasingly isolated minority. Their answer
was to continue supporting the South Carolina government, which Hudson gives
as their reason for Confederate military service.
Later, historians would expand on Hudson’s anthropological theme.
James H. Merrill has written two books on the Catawbas: The Indians’ New
World (1989), which traces their history from colonial times through the removal
period of the 1830s, 5 and The Catawbas (also 1989), which continues his study of
the Catawba Nation to the present day, but it only contained one sentence, their
Civil War service, stating that sacrifice did not lessen the racial prejudice the
Catawbas suffered postwar.6 However, in his 1984 article in The Journal of
Southern History, Merrill traces the “education” of the Catawba people from
colonial colorblindness to antipathy toward blacks in the period of slavery and
cotton expansion. Especially significant, according to Merrell, was the growing
white propensity to link them with blacks, and the Catawbas’ desire to fight this
association. Unlike this thesis, Merrell never offers this racial antipathy toward
blacks as a possible cause for their Civil War service.
Two historians contributed much to our understanding of the Civil War
efforts of the Catawba soldiers. Thomas J. Blumer has written several books and
articles about the Catawba, having worked with and studied them for forty years.
In 1995, he published an article describing their Confederate Civil War service.
Blumer specifically attributed their military support to a tradition of helping South
Carolina continuously since colonial times.7 In Between Two Fires, Laurence
5

James H. Merrell, The Indians’ New World-The Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European
Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
6
James H. Merrell, The Catawbas (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989).
7
Thomas J. Blumer, “Record of the Catawba Indians’ Confederate Service,” South Carolina
Historical Magazine Vol. 96, No. 3, July 1995.
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Hauptman masterfully traces the Civil War military experience of every Indian
tribe that fought for both the Confederacy and the Union.8 In discussing the
Catawbas, Hauptman postulates four possible motivations for their participation
in the war. One of these is the tribe’s economic and psychological dependence by
1860 on South Carolina, but the racial parameters of this dependence remain
untouched.
This study covers the period from 1840 through 1890, the fifty years
bracketing the American Civil War. By 1890, the census for Catawba Township,
York County, South Carolina, enumerated only sixty Catawbas.9 They were the
remnant of the proud, populous tribe that numbered in the thousands in 1670,
when Carolina began to be populated by Europeans and Africans. Analyzing the
movements and events of these fifty years will give insight into the decline and
dispersal that became a seismic shift for these people.
To explain this seismic shift, we must go back to the 1700s when the
process commenced. This prologue will show how the Catawbas interacted with
the white man, and how, after 1800, these interactions—resulting from the rapidly
increasing settler population—undermined and destroyed their world.
In 1796 George Washington made this entry in his diary:
I have been incommoded, at this place (Mount Vernon), by a visit of
several days, from a party of a dozen Catawbas, and should wish while I
am at this retreat, to avoid a repetition of such guests. (They) seemed to
be under apprehension that some attempts were making to deprive them of
(the lands) which were secured for them by Treaty.10
In that meeting, the Catawba headsmen had come to petition an old and
respected friend. Washington was very familiar with the Catawbas. As a young
8

Laurence M. Hauptman, Between Two Fires-American Indians in the Civil War (New York:
Free Press Paperbacks, 1995).
9
“Population Schedules of the Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, South Carolina”
(Washington, D.C.: Census Office, 1880) Section T-1243: Williamsburg and York Counties.
10
Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 276.
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colonial British officer in Virginia, he had recruited them to fight against the
French and their Indian allies. Subsequently he had witnessed their military skill
and loyalty once more in the Revolutionary War.
What was the reason these representatives of an extremely small South
Carolina tribe had journeyed to consult with the President, and why would
Washington even host them at his home? What of these Catawba lands that
Washington alludes to? Most significantly, what are we to make of his annoyed
reaction to their visit?
Washington’s brief, almost terse entry captures the changes the Catawba
Indians had undergone in slightly more than a century of experience with
European settlement.
The Catawbas had first encountered the white man in one of DeSoto’s
expeditions, led by Juan Pardo and his military party in 1540. After this initial
contact there was only sporadic contact with inland traders until 1670. At that
time two hundred settlers, under the Lords’ Proprietor charter from Charles II,
established the Carolina colony at the mouth of the Ashley River. From the
beginning, the colonists’ contact with this native people was mutually cordial. As
the colony prospered, the Catawbas proved invaluable in many aspects: as a
buffer from potentially hostile tribes, and also from the French and Spanish to the
West and South; as trade partners; as hired agents to track and return runaway
slaves; and as teachers in understanding this new land. But for the Catawba, there
was an increasing downside to white familiarity. The colonists came to want
more of the Indians’ lands, feared reprisal attacks, and especially became
terrorized at the thought of a combined revolt by a rapidly growing slave
population in concert with the Indians. Already by 1671 Carolina’s early leaders
concluded that the key to managing the local Indians was to recruit them as slave
catchers by offering guns and ammunition as incentive. To pay for the weapons,
5

the native clients raided other Indians for captives to sell as slaves, or tracked and
returned runaway Africans. The gun trade rendered the natives dependent upon
weapons they could neither make nor repair.

(Thus) the Carolinians gained

mastery over a network of native peoples, securing their own frontier and
wreaking havoc on a widening array of Indians.11
Without guns and ammunition, the Indians could not hunt for food or
skins to trade, and faced the very real threat of being slave-raided themselves by
better armed rivals.
Fortunately, we have a witness to those times. John Lawson lived in the
early Carolina colony, and even then recognized the purposeful use of trade to
gain mastery over the Indians. Lawson is uniquely placed to our understanding of
the Catawbas and the other peoples in this earliest colonial period. In 1701, he set
out to observe and record the native peoples and their land. Eight years later he
published A New Voyage to the Carolinas. Lawson’s portrayal of the traditional
Catawba life before it was irrevocably changed by European settlement is
invaluable. His narrative is the first recorded description of the Catawbas in the
English language. He chronicles the abandoned Catawba villages and the greatly
reduced numbers of them, decimated by white culture, diseases, and wars.
Throughout his description of the Catawbas he knew and observed, he also
attempted to interpret their experience. Lawson’s admiration for their character
and way of life in this early period is telling, as when he wrote:
They are better to us than we are to them. They always give us food at
their quarters, and take care we are armed against Hunger and Thirst. We
do not do so by them.
We look upon them with scorn and
distain…though, if well examined, we shall find that, for all our religion
and culture, we possess more moral deformities and evils than these
savages do, or are acquainted with.12
11
12

Alan Taylor, American Colonies (New York: Penguin Press, 2001), 228.
Taylor, American Colonies, 426.
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Population estimates done by ethnologist James Mooney help place a
human face on this devastation. In the earliest colonial period (c.1682) there were
as many as six thousand in the tribe. Increasing white contact with the migration
of the colonists onto the Piedmont resulted in a drastic drop in Catawba numbers
to about sixteen hundred in 1728, a seventy percent (70%) decline in less than
fifty years. Twelve hundred remained by the time of the French and Indian War,
and by the end of the Revolutionary War, only 250 survived. The Catawba had a
staggering 95% mortality in only one hundred years of contact with the white
man.13 Warfare caused very little of this devastation. Diseases were the most
significant cause, but guns, alcohol, and other means from the white culture
contributed to it. By Washington’s assessment in 1796, the resulting loss of selfesteem and the waning of their influence rendered the Catawbas progressively
more peripheral to the emerging white power structure. In 1761, the Catawba
were still “as brave fellows as any on the Continent of America,” but by 1784
they were “such as would excite the derision and contempt of the more Western
savages.”14
By the 1740s the Catawba were already comprehending their ever-more
precarious situation and fashioning their own answers. Grim as these numbers
are, they would have been much worse except for a social-ethnic phenomenon
that was occurring during this period. As the Catawba tribe itself struggled to
adapt and survive, it became the nexus for the remnants of other Carolina tribes
unable to do the same. The Catawbas in the mid-17th century provided the means
of survival for their fellow Southeastern Siouan language peoples, and even for
unrelated peoples from other language stock tribes.
13

In Douglas Summers

Cole J. Blease, “The Catawba Indians of South Carolina,” Congressional Record-Senate, 72nd
Congress, Volume 63, February 26, 1930, 4258. Blease cites Mooney’s 1894 monograph “Siouan
Tribes of the East.”
14
Blease, “The Catawba Indians,” 4258. Again Blease cites Mooney.
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Brown’s analysis of this melding movement, the Catawba tribe evolved into the
Catawba Nation.

This amalgamated entity now sheltered, sustained and

incorporated these Indians on the verge of extinction.
Thirty known tribes of Indians have resided in South Carolina since the
coming of the white man. The Catawbas are the sole survivors. These Siouan
tribes, plus fragments of other depleted bands of Indians of mixed origin who took
refuge with them following various conflicts with the white men, eventually made
up what in historical terms has been called “The Catawba Nation.” Twenty-two
tribes formed the Catawba Nation as early as 1743.15
Indeed, this process was noted by James Adair, an Indian trader and agent
with the Catawbas during this period. Adair described this blending of diverse
peoples into a surviving whole. He noted the cacophony of over twenty dialects
being spoken in the Catawba villages, which resulted from the Catawbas making
a new composite society with the refugees of other broken tribes. Also, by 1740,
the resulting Catawba Nation was increasingly dependent on South Carolina. 16
The other survival mechanism of the Catawba Nation was what had always
ensured their existence in the past: their fierce warrior tradition. However, now
they fought in diminished numbers. And they fought on two fronts.
The first front was a continuation of the pre-Colonial battles with their
Indian enemies. For the Catawba, the 18th century was a period of a constant war
against two native enemies: the Iroquois to the north and the Cherokee to the
west.

The protracted Catawba-Iroquois conflict was, however, the far more

consequential. This warfare lasted more than one hundred years. The Catawbas
were essentially under siege for this entire period, unable even to venture out in

15

Brown, The Catawba Indians, 1-5.
Charles M. Hudson, The Catawba Indians of South Carolina (Athens: The University of
Georgia Press, 1969), 47-48.
16
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hunting parties for food.

In 1751, King Hagler, the beloved leader of the

Catawbas, sought peace. Hagler led a delegation of six aboard a ship from
Charleston harbor to New York City, and then up the Hudson to Albany. There
this Catawba peace party and the Iroquois leaders spent two months working out a
truce, then an acceptable plan to end hostilities. Despite sporadic conflicts over
the next fifty years, the Catawba-Iroquois warfare ceased.
The second front was opened as the Catawbas emerged as trusted allies in
British colonial rule, and subsequently to the new Federal government and the
State of South Carolina. From first white contact, the Catawba willingly aided the
South Carolina government, and assisted the settlers in their conflicts.

The

Catawbas’ initial aid was to control hostile native peoples that threatened the early
colony.

As settlement progressed, the Catawbas fought the Indian allies of

Britain’s foes, especially the Cherokees who sided with France. This occasioned
Washington’s recruitment of their aid in that conflict. This alliance culminated
with the colonial government rewarding the Catawba Nation an immense
144,000-acre land grant surrounding their ancestral homes near Rock Hill, South
Carolina. This was done under the Treaty of Augusta in 1763, the same one
mentioned by Washington in his diary. But even service and sacrifice in the
American Revolution couldn’t preserve this grant; sweeping changes were
evident within two generations of its issue. The fear of loss that the Catawbas felt
was not without reason.
Lawson, Adair, and finally Washington, had all traveled across the same
Piedmont area, seeking to learn about its peoples. But irrevocable changes had
occurred in the one hundred years between those travels. Lawson and Adair had
found a land where the Catawba exercised influential power and control. By the
1790s that same land was firmly the ascendant white man’s world. The Indians—
now the intruders—were fading in importance and influence.
9

The former

colonists had secured their own nation, displacing the Indians and any power they
might have had previously. This shift had been under way before 1712 and would
continue past 1796, but by then the balanced had tipped forever away from the
Indians.
Washington and his fellow Americans were not ungrateful, but the status
of the Catawbas as significant military associates and a useful source of trade and
guidance to the new lands had irrevocably disappeared in the rush of these
changes. The Catawbas no longer commanded attention or respect. They had
become, in the dominant white view, an almost annoying, obstructive, and
marginal people.

10

CHAPTER I
1840-1860—THE NATIONS FORD TREATY:
ITS ORGINS AND LASTING EFFECTS
1840 was a watershed year for the Catawba people. On March 13, a treaty
was formalized between their Indian Nation and the State of South Carolina.
Known as the Nations Ford Treaty, it formalized their deepest fear: after ceding
their land, their life-source, they were to be removed. George Washington’s diary
observation of only fifty years previously proved to be prescient.
This loss of their homeland was not an abrupt event. 1840 may have been
the marker, but the process had begun decades before. The Treaty was a direct
outcome of the rapid growth of cotton in the South. Cotton had become King
after the invention of the gin in 1793, reshaping both the economics and
demographics of South Carolina. Planters rapidly moved into the Piedmont,
clearing the forests to take advantage of the fertile cotton-growing soil.

To

produce the cotton they brought their slaves in ever-increasing numbers. Between
1790 and 1810, the Piedmont witnessed a 194% growth in slave population, an
increase far greater than any other section of the State.17 The frontiersmen and
traders were pushed to the West, and the remaining Catawba began to be
pressured socially and economically.

No one thought that the Catawbas’

Piedmont land was now fit only for the Indians. These economic pressures and
the chain of events they unleashed actually began well before the 1840 takeover
of the Catawba lands.18

17

Before examining the condition and actions of the

Rachel N. Klein, Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South
Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990),
251 and 253.
18
Hudson, The Catawba Nation, 61.

Catawbas in this crucible period, we first need to understand the background
events and dynamics that precipitated this unparalleled shift for them from 1800
forward.
As the Northeast became increasingly industrialized in the years after the
War of 1812, the states of the Southeast intensified their agricultural dependence
rather than diversify their economic base. Agriculturalists began an intensive
search for a new staple crop that would be lucrative and adaptable to the
increasingly settled Piedmont. Cotton was easily grown in the Upcountry, but its
economic impact was severely limited by the labor-intensive separation of the
fiber from the cotton seed. Around 1800, two factors combined to radically
change cotton production. One was the invention of a practical cotton gin. With
early gins, a worker could clean five pounds of cotton a week. Whitney’s gin,
before any modifications, enabled that worker to ready fifty pounds in a single
day. Coupled with growth of England’s textile industry and the fledgling New
England textile industry, the demand for cotton escalated. South Carolina had
found and embraced the anchor to her agricultural economy and society. Between
1790 and 1800 alone, the state’s cotton exports soared from 9,840 pounds to
greater than 6,425,000.19
Rachael Klein traces how this phenomenal cotton growth in the early
1800s led to the political unification of South Carolina’s Lowcountry planters and
Upcountry yeoman farmers.

Before cotton expansion these two significant

political groups and their sections were diverging politically, primarily over
slavery.

Most Upcountry inhabitants were yeoman non-slaveholders.

The

plantations that depended upon slave labor were primarily in the Lowcountry. Its
leaders feared that the growing yeoman farmers’ spirit of republicanism would

19

Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 247-248.
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doom support for slavery. Klein notes that in 1800 most of the wealthy planters
inhabited the coastal areas, with only a scattering inland. Klein convincingly
shows that the spread of the new cotton plantations—and with them slavery—to
the Upcountry caused the transformation of these diverse spheres into a cohesive
political and economic union, a remarkable phenomenon. The advance of the
cotton-slave culture unified the politically divided planters and yeomen farmers,
who forged a common ethos and mindset, united South Carolinians, and
ultimately led to the state’s pivotal role in Secession. As Klein notes:
The inland spread of cotton culture affected the course of South Carolina,
and, for that matter United States history, not by creating a class of inland
planters, but by increasing their numbers and enhancing their regional
power…Throughout the later eighteenth century, the primary cause of
sectional tension (in South Carolina) had been the small slaveholders and
non-slaveholders who had comprised the inland majority. Opponents of
inland demands for political parity…feared that the democratic-republican
vision that prevailed in the backcountry might develop, among yeomen,
into a more dangerous assault on South Carolina planters.20
The planter classes of both regions united, forging a society that the
yeoman farmers of the upcountry bought into, and indeed became dependent upon
both economically and socially. With more inland settlers acquiring slaves and
more inland

areas potentially vulnerable to

black

majorities, coastal

representatives could finally rest assured that backcountry republicanism would
not be a spearhead of antislavery. The reapportionment Reform of 1808 both
reflected and resolved fundamental coastal concerns by ensuring that Black Belt
districts would control the state legislature. All citizens and all areas of South
Carolina came together in support of the slavery that drove their cotton economic
engine.

20

Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 238.
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Cotton had not been responsible for the advance of leading inland families
to planter status, nor had cotton alone prompted the formation of
interregional political alliances. Bound together by their joint involvement
in the slave system, inland and coastal leaders had fundamental interests in
common even before the Revolution.
What cotton expansion did was to reassure coastal leaders that the
backcountry could be a trusted ally in the struggle to protect slavery from
any possible interference.21
For the Catawbas, this explosive expansion of cotton and slavery was a
double-edged sword. In addition to eventually claiming their land, it acutely
focused their status and self-consciousness as the third race in a now set biracial
society. Catawba historian James Merrell emphasizes the crisis that this created
in the Catawba people. “In this color-conscious society, anyone with dark skin
was in danger of being classified as ‘Colored.’ No wonder the Catawba were said
by one white observer to ‘live in obsessed fear of being regarded as colored and
classified with Negroes.’”

This association would become a recurring vital

concern for the Indians.22 Both Hudson and Merrell raised the issue of racial
tension, but never ascribe this fear of identification with blacks as the cause of
their Civil War sacrifices.
David Hutchison provides us with a first-hand account of what was
happening to the Catawbas as these economic and social forces were evolving. In
that period he and his family lived on the Catawba tract with a handful of other
white families.

There they enjoyed mutual harmony and respect with the

Catawbas. Hutchison begins by stating his qualifications. “I am,” he wrote, “one
of the oldest settlers on The Indian Land, and one of the commissioners who
made

the

Treaty.”23

Hutchison

then

21

recalled

the

loyalty,

military

Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 267-268.
Merrell, The Catawbas, 66-67.
23
David Hutchison, “The Catawba Indians by Request” Columbia: The Palmetto State Banner,
August 30, 1849, 1. The Draper Manuscript Collection, Vol. 10-“Frontier Wars,” 99-101.
22
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accomplishments, and sacrifice of the Catawba warriors he had personally served
with during the Revolution. Because of this experience, he afterwards settled on
Catawba land, learning first-hand about all the Catawba people, not just their
warriors. Hutchinson had thus befriended all tribal members, had known the
Catawbas for over seventy years, and had lived among them for over half a
century. He describes these people at that time as follows:
At this time I think they numbered from 150 to 200 fighting men, all
temperate, and the women remarkably so. I believe they could not have
been persuaded to taste liquor…The women were industrious and made
corn.
After the Revolution, there was an influx of white settlers, Hutchison
among them. Welcomed to settle by the Catawbas, these white settlers were all
Revolutionary War veterans without sufficient land to support their young
families. Hutchison noted that during the Revolution these men
…had become acquainted with a number of Indians, and were favorites
with them. (these fellow-veterans) were encouraged by the Indians and
the whites already settled, to come and live on their land, which most of
them did. They commenced poor in property, but rich in independence.
The motto was to live sparingly and work hard.
Thus, the initial, few white settlers on the Indian Land were landowners and
trusted friends of the Catawbas. When the cotton flood burst on all of them in the
early 1800s, the Indians’ land became known and the precedent for white
settlement had been set. As the number of new settlers mushroomed, the Indians
had “given up all idea of farming. The Indians commenced renting their Land,
appointing three agents to act for them.”24 This development immediately and
forever changed the Catawba/white settler relationship, as the formal lease
business approach replaced the personal relationships of a few years previously.
24

Hutchison, “The Catawba Indians by Request,” 1-2.
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By the early 1800s—a mere generation after the Revolution—these
dynamics forever changed when South Carolina implemented the “right” of the
Catawbas to lease their land for agriculture.

Leasing their prime lands for

extremely low rates only delayed the inevitable process of the Catawbas losing
their homelands. The leaseholders were supposed to pay a substantial bounty
bonus up-front when the lease was signed, then significant rent payments each of
the ninety-nine years of the term of the lease. The extant lease documents tell a
much different story. In reality, the average rent was only a quarter of what the
law proscribed, and even fell as low as 12.5 cents. Equally deceptive was the
settlers’ version of the bounty.

Most were never paid. When it was, the

leaseholders viewed the bounty as an advance on future rent due, not up-front
money as it was intended.25
As the pressure for more cotton land escalated, so did the debate in South
Carolina about the seizure of the territory granted to the Catawbas in 1763-1764.
Despite growing pressure to give up their land from Washington’s time, the
Catawba had remained adamant.

In 1839, the South Carolina House of

Representatives authorized a Commission to negotiate with the tribe to cede their
now-valuable land.26 Two previous attempts by the Legislature to purchase the
Catawba lands failed because the state negotiators were unknown to the Indians.
Now the Legislature appointed five with whom the Indians were well acquainted.
David Hutchison was named the chief South Carolina negotiator. The personal
nature and good intentions of the 1839 negotiators toward the Catawbas is
captured when Hutchison relates how he himself consulted with North Carolina
authorities about the proposed exchange land to be purchased there. Only when
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satisfied that the tract was “suitable location for the Indians,” and that relocation
was both desired by the Catawbas and would benefit them, did Hutchison and his
fellow negotiators conclude the 1840 Treaty with their friends and neighbors.27
These five commissioners also wrote a report on their negotiations with
the tribe. That Report of the Commissioners documented what life was like for
the Catawba at this time.

Ironically praising their loyal service in the

Revolutionary War, the report then describes the tribe’s current condition. At that
time, few Catawbas were still living on their traditional land in York County.
“From a once populous tribe,” it noted, “they dwindled down to twelve men,
thirty-six women, and forty young ones.” The Treaty negotiators found that “The
Catawba have leased out every foot of land they held within their boundary. For
the last few years they have been wondering through the country forming kinds of
camps without any homes…and destitute of any species of (personal) property
save dogs and a few worthless horses.” The Commissioners next related that even
this early the Catawba seemed desirous of having a tract of land on which they
could again “settle…and build little houses and procure some cattle, hogs, and
poultry.” Leasing their lands had essentially made them homeless at home. This
report confirmed that the wandering life of the Catawba had been going on since
the leasing period began around 1800.28
Even at this stage one can detect stirrings of conscience and obligation.
The Commissioners reported that during the negotiations “their Chief (General
Kegg) remarked that when they were a strong Nation and the State weak, they
came to Her support, and now when the State was strong and the Catawbas weak,
She ought to assist them.” This Report of the Commissioners also contains an
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undeniable sympathy for the Catawbas and a sense of obligation to look out for
their interests. However, in spite of the respect these men had for the Catawbas,
the white stereotype of the Indian still surfaces in their report. In their aggregate
experience these men had never heard a charge of dishonesty or meddling against
any Catawba. They “have always been harmless, peaceable and friendly, but (as
is perhaps characteristic of Indians generally) they are indolent and improvident
and seem to have little idea of laying up for their future wants.”29
Notwithstanding their military service and being good neighbors, the Tribal
members were still viewed as being Indians, that is lazy and lacking any concept
or capability of changing themselves for the better.

This stereotype proved

pervasive and persistent. After Hutchison and the Treaty negotiators the sense of
responsibility for the Catawba people also continued, primarily by their white
neighbors, by the state Catawba Indian agents, and even by South Carolina’s
governors. For their part, the Catawbas were unable to shake a similar sense of
obligation to South Carolina, no matter how they were maltreated. This pattern of
interdependence and caring suggests paternalism.
Eugene D. Genovese has thoroughly examined paternalism in the
antebellum South. His goal was to understand the relationship between planters
and slaves.
The Old South, black and white, created a historically unique kind of
paternalistic society…Southern paternalism, like every other paternalism,
had little to do with Ole Massa’s ostensible benevolence, kindness, and
good cheer. It grew out of the necessity to discipline and morally justify a
system of exploitation, but it simultaneously encouraged cruelty and
hatred. The racial distinction between master and slave heightened the
tension inherent in an unjust social order.30
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Clearly the Catawba people did not share the same relationship with whites as the
slaves did.

Nevertheless there were significant similarities to the form of

paternalism interactions that Genovese describes.
Genovese stresses the hegemonic role of the planter class in Southern
society of this prewar period. Indeed, it is their undue influence over other South
Carolinians that made possible the social and political unification chronicled by
Klein. The Catawbas, too, seemed to be have been entrapped in the social and
political domination of this sweeping dynamic.

Two factors of Genovese’s

antebellum paternalism are particularly applicable to the Catawbas.

First,

Genovese stresses the dual dynamics of the plantation system. It was a social
confine in which both slave owners and slaves exerted power or “agency.” The
slaves had reciprocal power to influence the planters, and they used it. The slaves
were forced to accept slavery, but at the same time, they were able to interact
within it, especially to be able to exert influence on the “controlling” masters.
The Catawbas likewise came to assert an increasing initiative in their relationship
with white South Carolina, and, thus, were not content to passively accept the
government’s treatment of them. Their “agency” is a significant part of the story
of this period of 1840 through the outbreak of the Civil War.
The second significant effect of paternalism on the slave as Genovese
argues was to make the crushing system seem ironically personal. The whole
thrust of events might be destructive to them, but they had a personal history and
relationship with their master and his family. The Catawbas, for their part, had a
similar strong and binding relationship with white South Carolinians, a
relationship that had been ongoing almost two centuries. Significantly, both sides
were unable to abandon each other in spite of powerful arguments and attempts to
do so.
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By 1840, the lines of the South Carolina-Catawba conflict were welldrawn, and the two protagonists were to enter a period from 1840 to 1860 of
settling the conditions of the Catawbas’ ceding of their land and their removal
from South Carolina. The Nations Ford Treaty can be viewed as the opening
skirmish of this crucial conflict.
The 1840 Nations Ford Treaty was a single, simple sheet of paper
containing three brief paragraphs. At that time its eventual significance could not
possibly have been known.

The Treaty, however, provided the basis for

understanding subsequent events.
A Treaty
Entered into at the Nation Ford, Catawba, between the Chiefs and Head
Men of the Catawba Indians of the one part, and Commissioners
appointed under a Resolution of the Legislature, passed December 1839.
Article 1st. The Chiefs and Head Men of the Catawba Indians, for
themselves and the entire Nation, hereby agree to cede, sell, transfer, and
convey to the State of South Carolina all their right, title and interest to
this boundry of land, lying on both sides of the Catawba River, situate in
the districts of York and Lancaster, and which are represented in a plat of
survey of fifteen miles square, made by Samuel Wiley, and dated the
twenty second day of February, one thousand seven hundred, and sixty
four, and now on file in the office of Secretary of State.
Article 2d. The Commissioners on their part engage, in behalf of the
State, to furnish the Catawba Indians with a tract of land of the value of
five thousand dollars: three hundred acres of which is to be good arable
lands, fit for cultivation, to be purchased in Haywood County, N.C., or in
some other mountainous or thinly populated region where the said Indians
may desire: and if no such tract can be procured to their satisfaction, they
shall be entitled to receive the foregoing amount in cash from the State.
Article 3d. The Commissioners further engage that the State shall pay the
said Catawba Indians two thousand five hundred dollars each year
thereafter for the space of nine years. In witness whereof, the contracting
parties have hereunto set their hands and seals this twentieth day of
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March, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty, and in the
sixty-fourth year of American independence.31
The Catawbas thus ceded their land to South Carolina. However, the State
never allocated the funds nor obtained the required new land for resettlement.
This failure unleashed a complex chain of events between the tribe and the State
of South Carolina that was played out over the next generation. The Nation
struggled to find a new homeland after the Treaty of 1840, and eventually was
driven to attempt its own efforts at relocation to the Indian Territory. Previous
historians, however, have said very little about how the South Carolina
Legislature repeatedly frustrated the Catawbas’ endeavors by its continuous
refusal to honor the state’s obligations under that Nations Ford Treaty. The
Legislature’s continued course of obstruction was even more reprehensible when
one considers the constant reminders and pleas from governors, the Catawba
agents, and the local York County white citizens. Being non-literate at this time,
the Catawbas themselves were seemingly unable to contribute to the
historiography of their experiences during these prewar decades.

But they

registered their plight by actions rather than words, as evidenced by their efforts
to leave South Carolina.
In this drama, the South Carolina State Government and the Catawbas
followed radically different courses.

The State’s goal was clear:

to rid

themselves of a no longer useful people and take their lands for the new cotton
plantation society. Unlike South Carolina, the Catawba seem to have been far
from having a determined master plan. They appear rather to have been earnestly
searching for what would be best for both the individuals and the tribe as a whole.
Clearly, the very fact that they actively explored their own ways for a solution
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spoke to their internal conflict and dilemma. Rather than a deliberate strategy of
blocking the State of South Carolina’s plans for them, the Catawbas attempted
independently were attempting to find their own solution.
It took only two years for Hutchison to realize that both he and the Indians
were to be betrayed by South Carolina’s authorities and Legislature. “As to the
Indians, I account the Act both just and generous,’ he wrote in 1842, “but as to the
mode of carrying it out, the reverse.”32 By 1844 the Catawba Indians felt the
effects of this noncompliance so acutely that they took the unprecedented step of
presenting a petition directly to the South Carolina House, “praying for a
distribution of the proceeds of the Catawba Lands lately conveyed by their treaty,
to enable them to remove to the West.”33 Significantly, this was the first initiative
undertaken directly by the Tribe.
South Carolina’s recurring failure to satisfy its obligations became a
continuous problem for the Indians as they tried to move ahead. The legislators
gave the Catawbas neither land nor means for relocation. Thus, despite paying
less than 3.5 cents per acre for the Catawbas’ prime land, both the payments and
the promised replacement land were never funded.

The Indian lands were

essentially stolen. Even more than in George Washington’s time, the Catawba
Nation had outlived its usefulness to South Carolina, and South Carolinians
thought they had seen the last of the Catawba. “As a nation,” Governor David
Johnson said of the Catawba in 1847, “they are, in effect, dissolved.”34
For the Catawba, The Treaty of 1840 meant immediate upheaval and
uprooting.

In 1841, the Cherokee of Western North Carolina, who had not

previously been removed, unilaterally accepted about half of their old rivals, and
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about eighty Catawbas eventually moved there. They were welcomed by the
Cherokee but not by North Carolina government officials.

This was hardly

surprising, since South Carolina had made no effort to purchase the promised tract
for the Catawba, and by late 1841 North Carolina Governor Morehead not only
refused to accept the Catawba, but he even sarcastically proposed that the North
Carolina Cherokee should instead settle themselves in South Carolina.35 But
official resistance was not what doomed this first attempt to solve the Catawba
dilemma; rather it was the Catawbas themselves who rejected the generous offer
of their neighboring Cherokees since they could not put aside their past conflicts.
Moreover, the Catawba balked at giving up their customs and language, feeling
they were being subsumed into the Cherokee culture.

Long accustomed to

assimilating other tribes, they could not negotiate a complete role change.
Gradually most moved back to South Carolina, squatting on their former lands or
rejoining the Catawba who had remained behind. South Carolina officials finally
placed the Catawbas on six hundred and thirty acres of the original lands granted
in 1763 near Rock Hill. This was but a small, unproductive section of their
former holdings, and even this land was intended to be a transient holding area
pending removal.36 This land, today known as the Old Reservation, remains the
Catawba home.
The vacillation of South Carolina continued through the 1840s.

The

Executive Branch realized the need for an equitable solution, and repeatedly
urged the Legislature to honor its obligations.

Governor Hammond, in his

Legislative Message of November 28, 1843, informed the recalcitrant lawmakers
of his personal interest in the Catawbas’ plight resulting from the legislators’
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inaction.

Hammond had, he noted, made “very particular enquires into the

condition of the Catawba Indians.

I visited their neighborhood myself and

conversed with most of their head men.” Governor Hammond concluded his
Message by acknowledging that relocation to North Carolina was not an option
unless South Carolina reversed its inaction. He proposed a plan for resolution of
the stalemate that had been getting wide attention by both the Catawbas and the
State, which was to allow and aid “the Catawba…to be removed beyond the
Mississippi.”37
In 1847, South Carolina’s new Governor David Johnson in his turn
reported to the Legislature on the Catawba. He confirmed that many had left
North Carolina to return to their native area, while a few had gone to Tennessee
and others wanted to go to Georgia to join the Chickasaws.

The failure to

implement the Treaty of 1840, originally intended to secure them a new
homeland, was now causing the further dispersion of the tribe. Johnson urged
action, but the Legislature responded that they had insufficient information to act
and recommended yet another commission and inquiry.38 South Carolina was
caught in an endless cycle of inquires and procrastination.
Johnson renewed his efforts the next year. Another investigation was not
needed, he argued, as the Catawbas’ condition had been well documented. In
another message to the Legislature Johnson relayed the substance of Catawba
Agent Joseph F. White’s 1847 annual report. “They still remain in a wandering
and unsettled condition,” White declared.

“The sums annually distributed

amongst them do not contribute in any essential degree to their comfort or
convenience.” This first-hand report on the Catawbas’ needs exactly echoed the
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Treaty Commissioners’ Report of 1840.

In a promising departure, Johnson

proposed an innovative solution. William H. Thomas, the North Carolina Agent
for the Cherokee, “has for some time had under his paternal care a portion of the
Cherokee Indians remaining in the western part of North Carolina.” Thomas
noted how an appropriation from the State of North Carolina had allowed him to
purchase land for his Cherokee people. He proposed and invited the Catawba to
settle there on their own section of that tract. Thomas intended a two-year trial
period, and the Indians would need continued support from South Carolina until
they achieved self-sufficiency.

Thomas, who had worked tirelessly for the

Cherokee, added a qualifier for Catawba participation, indicating that even those
who worked closely with the Indians couldn’t escape prejudice.
If here, they must quit their dissipation, which if continued, would soon
cause them to become extinct, and like the Cherokees, support themselves
and families by labor. Learning Indians to live without work and to
depend upon annuities, has a bad effect on them. The only aid they should
receive is to support them selves by labor.”39
This innovative approach apparently died in committee, for no mention of its
development can be found in the South Carolina legislative records.
Johnson was succeeded as Governor by Whitemarsh B. Seabrook. In his
1849 Governor’s Message, he too chastised South Carolina for not complying
with its obligations under the Treaty of 1840. Seabrook feared the very real
possibility of the Catawba extinction as a result of the Legislature’s intractable
inaction, noting that “only one woman and her six children were at that time
living on the tract of traditional homeland in York County that had been set aside
as a temporary expedient.” Seabrook specifically ascertained that the amount due
the Indians at $11,800, and since almost ten years that had passed with no
39
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payment, Seabrook calculated the true debt, with interest, was almost twice that
amount. Further, Seabrook declared:
When the debt of twenty-one thousand dollars shall be discharged, our
obligation to minister to the wants of the Catawba Indians will by no
means have ceased. To guard with paternal affection these children in
disposition and intellect is at once dictated by humanity and gratitude.
The period is perhaps not too remote, when the last sod will be thrown on
the grave of a people who, individually and collectively, have been
faithful to the land of their adoption, and in times of peril, zealous in the
protection of its honor and interests.40
At this juncture a new agency with a new approach entered the picture: the
Federal government. In his same 1849 Legislative Message, Governor Seabrook
recalled that North Carolina had been proactive in seeking Federal aid for removal
of the remnant of the Cherokee. That Federal grant of five thousand dollars,
however, only applied to North Carolina. Seabrook reasoned that if his state also
applied for aid, the means to solve their dilemma could similarly be obtained from
the national government. Seabrook quickly asked the Legislature to seek United
States Government help.
I recommend that an application be made to Congress for an appropriation
equivalent to the amount set apart for North Carolina, to defray the
expenses of the removal of the tribe; also, that an agent be appointed …to
superintend their emigration to the West.41
Seabrook next appointed a commission to visit the Catawbas and
determine their condition.

This 1850 report had four findings.

First, the

commission indicted previous policy, stating bluntly that South Carolina had
failed its Indians. Next, members recommended that the tribe be removed to the
West together with the North Carolina Cherokee.
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recommended that all the monies due the Catawba be used to create annuities,
which would be issued to individuals, not paid out as before in cash and supplies.
Citing the Legislature’s non-compliance, they acknowledged that
The whole amount undertaken to be paid the Indians by the State is now
past due, and should be funded for their benefit. The obligation is perfect
and complete.
Finally, Seabrook’s commission endorsed the Governor’s earlier idea of involving
the Federal Government. For the first time South Carolina sought help from
Washington, D.C.

The legislators hoped to package the Catawbas with the

Cherokee, or another Federally-protected tribe, in order to get them totally out of
the Carolinas. Again, no actual monies would leave the state treasury. Removal
of the Catawba to the Indian Territory necessitated the approval and agency of the
United States Government.42 This new proposal led to a dialogue with the Bureau
of Indian Affairs over the next few years, but efforts to effect a joint removal of
both the Cherokee and Catawba were once again frustrated by the Indians, as the
Catawbas refused to move to the Indian Territory and the Cherokee there refused
to accept them.43
Consideration next turned to placing the Catawbas with another tribe
already removed to the West. For the first time, the Catawba stated directly what
they wanted: they petitioned the Federal government in an attempt to overcome
South Carolina’s failures. John Mullay, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, had
completed a census of the Catawba remaining in North Carolina, during which
Catawba Chief William Morrison had “desired me to make it known to the Dept.
that his people preferred a home with the Chickasaws west; and stated that at one
42
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time the Chickasaws had given the Catawba an invitation to settle among them…I
suggested to Morrison that he should write freely to the Department.”
Instead, in October 1848, Morrison wrote directly to President Polk:
We the undersigned Catawba Indians…having been badly treated, cheated
and defrauded…humbly beg His Excellency the President …to remove us
west of the Miss. under an act of the late Congress. With the hope His
Excellency will grant our request we remain your most o.b.svts.44
In response, William Medill, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, instructed the
Chief of the Chickasaw Agency, A. Upshaw, to gauge the willingness of the
Chickasaw to accept the Catawbas.

On January 8, 1849, Agent Upshaw

responded that the Chickasaw chiefs were willing to accept the Catawbas
providing that they receive the Catawba annuity payments.45
Seabrook’s successor John H. Means continued this effort with the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. In his First Legislative Message in November 1851, Means
reported and strongly recommended, that funding “to grant them the means of
emigrating to the West, with the view of settling near the Chickasaws.”46 This
time it was the Chickasaw Council that voted it down.

This rebuff by the

Chickasaw did not deter a few of the frustrated Catawbas from making another
independent effort. Aided by tireless agent Joseph White, twenty-three of them
left South Carolina in December 1851, and those that survived the journey settled
with the Choctaw in Arkansas.

In November 1853, the Choctaw Council

admitted them as full citizens of the Choctaw Nation.47 After two hundred years
of adopting other tribes on the brink of extinction, the Catawba were themselves
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now the refugees. Those new Choctaw citizens bore the familiar Catawba names
of Morrison, Heart, Kegg, and Ayers.48
The Choctaws’ acceptance of this group enhanced the efforts of both the
state and national governments to achieve a Choctaw solution over the latter half
of the 1850s.49

South Carolina successfully involved the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, and the Catawba made their assent known. The only stumbling block
was finding a “congenial tribe” willing to accept them. Despite all these efforts to
reverse past policy, the Legislature in 1852 seemed ever determined to undermine
even this plan. Once again, the legislators refused to vote any monetary support,
and in 1856 the South Carolina House called for yet another commission to
explore union with the Choctaw Nation. Instead of funding these promising
relocation efforts, the Legislature claimed it owed even less. 50
By 1859, most Catawbas began to doubt the prospect of any Western plan.
Yet another Governor, William H. Gist, again reminded the Legislature of South
Carolina’s obligations. Gist had personally visited the Indians and found them to
be divided on the question of emigration. He suggested an appropriation to allow
some tribal leaders to visit the Choctaws and report back, with the hope of
convincing the uncertain ones to relocate.51 The funds to explore this new option
were allocated, and Chief Allen Harris and Headman John Harris journeyed to
visit the Choctaw Nation in late 1859.

The negotiations proved mutually

acceptable. The Catawba leaders were warmly received, and most of the families
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remaining agreed to move west. The Choctaw appeared willing to accept the
Catawba.52
In 1860, Governor Gist reported on the Harris’s journey of exploration.
Harris was so pleased with the country, and the reception he met with, that
he determined to remain, and has written such a flattering letter to his
tribe…that forty-seven out of the fifty-five of the Indians living in the
nation in this State, have agreed to remove.53
But even this close to resolving the stalemate the question of South Carolina’s
financial backing resurfaced.

Due to South Carolina’s inaction, Federal

appropriations had lapsed and South Carolina needed to fund the move alone.
Once again, no decision by South Carolina proved to be a decision as two outside
events in 1859-1860 scuttled these plans. The first was the death of Chief Allen
Harris, the prime motivator and architect of the plan.

More significantly

Secession now loomed large, as the Southern states sensed active Federal
opposition after John Brown’s raid and the election of Lincoln.
The Catawba people did not endure these antebellum struggles in
isolation. All the Indian tribes of the Southeast faced intense pressure to cede
their lands in the new economic order. But the Catawbas’ experience stands in
sharp contrast—even uniqueness—when compared to that of their fellow
Southeastern Indian neighbors. The exile of the Five Civilized Tribes began in
1830 with the Choctaws and ended with the Cherokee Trail of Tears in 18381839, coincidental with our study period of the Catawbas.

These other

Southeastern Indian peoples were pried out by the lever of Federal law and force.
In significant contrast, the Catawbas, who wanted to emigrate, were stymied by
South Carolina but also ignored by the Federal government. How and why this
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complete reversal of state and Federal roles operative for the other tribes occurred
is a matter that is at the heart of this thesis. There are no specific agreements or
documentation that proclaimed this Federal policy reversal with the Catawbas.
The explanation proposed here lies in the dynamics of the early national period.
The right, even the obligation, of the Federal government to handle Indian affairs
was established in the Constitution. The third power granted to Congress under
Article I, Section 8, included that of regulating commerce with the Indian tribes.
Very early in Washington’s first term Congress and the Executive passed
legislation to implement this prerogative.

“An Act to Regulate Trade and

Intercourse with the Indians Tribes” was enacted on July 22, 1790. It established
the power of the new national government to negotiate Indian treaties. Section
Four of that “non-intercourse act” as it came to be known specified
That no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of
Indians in the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to
any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not,
unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty,
held under the authority of the United States.
Subsequent revisions of this Act clarified and expanded that sole authority and
mechanism. Clearly the states were to have no dealings with Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court upheld this Federal control of Indian affairs in 1832 in
Worcester v. Georgia. Chief Justice John Marshall declared the opinion of the
Court. The Constitution
confers on Congress the powers of war and peace, of making treaties, and
of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is
required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indian tribes. They
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are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions; the shackles
imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded.54
This landmark decision was the basis for subsequent Indian land claims and other
redress efforts down through the present day.
Undoubtedly what South Carolina did in the 1830s, culminating in the
1840 Nations Ford Treaty, was unconstitutional.

But other concerns were

operative during this period, primarily the sense of a humanitarian obligation to
provide for the Indians. The idea of relocation gained ever more consideration as
assimilation and civilization efforts faltered.

According to historians Theda

Perdue and Michael D. Green
Clearly, however, the issue was more complicated than the lust for land.
No state could demand all the land owned by Indians and ignore the
question of what was to happen to them after they sold out. By 1820 the
popular ideology denied the possibility of “civilization” and assimilation
(of the Indian peoples), the only logical alternative was expulsion. No one
seriously suggested the third possibility, extermination. Expulsion, or
removal as it came to be known, was an idea that dated back to 1803 when
President Thomas Jefferson had contemplated the acquisition of
Louisiana…with the notion that eastern Indians might exchange their
lands for comparable tracts west of the Mississippi.55
Indeed, Jefferson’s years as President marked a watershed shift in national Indian
policy, when the attitudes, ideas, and mechanisms of Federal Indian policy were
debated and retooled. Anthony F.C. Wallace has thoroughly explored this in his
study Jefferson and the Indians-The Tragic Fate of the First Americans.
In the 1790s many prominent Americans, including Jefferson initially,
favored a civilizing policy toward these aboriginal people. Education, efforts to
shift their livelihood from nomadic hunting to settled agriculture and “household
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arts” production, and cultural assimilation would provide a better life, even
survival for them within the new white order.

Jefferson’s first message to

Congress in the spring of 1801 placed Indian affairs in a core position for his
Presidency and emphasized these noble goals.

However, at the same time

Jefferson called for white settlement of the vast, open lands “now vacant.” They
were vacant except for their Indian inhabitants. The conflict inherent in these two
ideas would prove the subject of much subsequent discussion and revision.56
Thus, in his first two years in office, Jefferson, guided by “civilizing”
principles, moved to obtain Indian lands by treaty and voluntary emigration,
particularly in the Southeast.

However, significant difficulties enforcing the

“Trade and Intercourse” acts, the escalating westward migration and its demands
for new settlement lands, and concerns about the surrounding presence of the
British, French, and Spanish and the threats they posed for the fledgling nation,
caused a rethinking of these early ideals.

Jefferson’s mature policy was

elucidated in the first half of 1803, coinciding with the Louisiana Purchase. This
revised national Indian policy sought a peaceful coexistence with the Indians,
increased trade (to make them dependent), and relocation.

The Louisiana

Purchase lands were originally seen as the sole alternative to extinction for
Indians rejecting white assimilation and “civilization.” Relocation also evolved
into the preferred method to accommodate the western migration and Manifest
Destiny.57 Interestingly, Jefferson even drafted a proposal for a constitutional
amendment to effect this plan. All whites—and their slaves—would be removed
from Louisiana to the East, and all Indians, in exchange for their Eastern lands,
would have the trans-Mississippi to themselves. Congress failed to act on his
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proposed amendment, but Jefferson’s idea of Indian removal to Western lands
became the centerpiece of Indian policy.58
Removal as central to solving the “Indian problem” was expanded to new
significance by Andrew Jackson. Jackson had gained fame as an Indian fighter
and negotiated many of the first treaties with the tribes. He was elected in 1828
with overwhelming Southern support, especially for his ideas on Indian expulsion.
Jackson proposed removal in his first Inaugural Address in 1829 and discussed his
ideas in every annual Message to Congress from 1829 through 1836. No other
issue was so consistently emphasized during his Presidency. The Indian Removal
Act of 1830, enacted very early in Jackson’s first term, became the final piece of
the Federal Indian policy.
Our two-part question—why did South Carolina handle the Catawbas on
its own, and why did the government in Washington allow that to happen?—
poses intriguing possibilities. Multiple factors were operative in South Carolina’s
treatment of the Catawbas being ignored in Washington.

They were an

insignificant tribe of around sixty individuals. Their land was entirely within
South Carolina, and did not border any other state or Federally-held territory. As
such the Federal government had no direct cause to intervene. Alternatively, the
Federal failure to follow through on national Indian policy could have happened
by default, and been a chance, random situation resulting from the circumstances
of that time. The principal reason, however, had to do with the evolving process
of establishing national governmental authority over the former essentially
independent colonies as they transitioned to statehood in a union.
This transition occurred in the late 1700s and early 1800s as the Articles
of Confederation, which were found unworkable in practice, were superseded by
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the Constitution. Specifically, the Articles of Confederation were ambiguous with
regards to whether the states or the national government were to control Indian
affairs, and the resulting confusion caused a hybrid system of regulation. Indian
affairs thus became an early issue in the ensuing pivotal struggle over the exact
delineation of state and Federal rights and obligations that characterized the
antebellum period. Two authors have studied this issue.
The first is Timothy Vollman, an attorney with over thirty years of
experience in American Indian law, who has represented both the Indian tribes
and the Bureau of Indian affairs. When contacted, he postulated on why South
Carolina was allowed to negotiate a treaty with the Catawbas outside the Federal
Constitution and law and suggested that the answer
may lie in the language of the Articles of Confederation. The Articles
contain very confusing compromise language on the relative roles of the
state and confederated governments in the area of Indian affairs. One
explanation for state treaty-making is that state officials may have labored
under the presumption that the Indian Commerce Clause and Nonintercourse Act did not change the law much from the 1780s when states
were legitimately negotiating with tribes.59
Vollman concludes with reference to the studies of Paul Prucha, who has
examined the complex and changing relationship of the national government and
the Indians in the formative years.

Prucha particularly cites the Articles of

Confederation as the prime source of confusion over control of Indian affairs.
John Marshall, in Worcester vs. Georgia emphasized that the shackles the Articles
of Confederation imposed on this Federal control of Indian affairs, were thus
discarded.

Prucha emphasizes that a careful reading of the Articles of

Confederation shows the ambiguity that led to the confusion over state-tribal
treaties. The first paragraph of Article VI covering treaties, he notes, reads “No
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State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled,
shall…enter any conference, agreement alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or
State.” No mention is made of Indian treaties or even defines the political status
of these peoples. The final paragraph of Article VIII states, “The United States in
Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power
of…regulating all affairs with the Indians, not members of any States, provided
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated.”

The relative federal and state power over Indian treaties was thus

unclear. Further complicating this was Article II, which at the start declared that
“each State retains…every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”
When one examines the course of Indian affairs through the periods of the
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and the first few decades of the
1800s, it was the Southern states, especially South Carolina, that voiced the main
resistance to acquiescing to the Federal control. John Dickinson‘s draft of the
Articles of Confederation in July 1776 included central regulation of trade and
management of all Indian affairs. This provision engendered strong debate, with
a decided split among the states. South Carolina adamantly wanted to manage its
tribes internally, and that opposition led to the final compromise language as
above. This confusing phrasing in the Articles of Confederation led to most
Southern states continuing to directly deal with their Indians, interpreting the
Articles in their own interests.60
Thus, the principle of Federal control existed but was seriously clouded by
the issue of states’ rights. This ambiguity led to uncertainty about who had the
power to manage Indian matters, and Congress had to continually reassert its
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dominance on this issue. James Madison characterized the resulting confusion
about Indian management under the Article of Confederation as obscure,
contradictory and incomprehensible in The Federalist when he was urging
adoption of the more definitive Constitution. The final, unanimous wording of
that blueprint stated that the Federal government had the power of war and peace,
treaties, and to regulate trade and commerce, including foreign nations, among the
states “and with the Indian tribes.” In Prucha’s view these five words proved
significant.
These five words would seem to be scant foundation upon which to build
the structure of Federal legislation regulating trade and intercourse with
the Indians. Yet through them, plus the treaty making and other powers,
Congress has ever since exercised what amounts plenary power over
Indian tribes.61
That phrase was the basis of John Marshall’s decision in Worcester vs. Georgia.
Marshall held that the powers granted by the Constitution in those words
comprehend all that is required for the regulation of intercourse with the Indians.
The Federal government asserted this Constitutional prerogative in the Nonintercourse Acts, the Indian removal legislation, and with military actions and
treaties to secure control of Indian affairs.
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CHAPTER II
1860-1866—THE CIVIL WAR EXPERIENCE OF THE CATAWBA PEOPLE
Within weeks of secession, the Catawbas volunteered to serve in the South
Carolina Militia, and their offer of military assistance was gratefully accepted.
This development was noted by The New York Times in an editorial published on
January 26, 1861, which couldn’t resist ridiculing the Catawbas’ action. Under
the heading “Whoop!” they derided the military ability—and even the
commitment—of the Catawbas to this or any cause. But before Northerners
panicked, especially “little old ladies” who had heard tales from their grandfathers
of the Catawbas’ fierce fighting in the Revolutionary War, the paper assured its
readers that these were not the same Catawbas of their grandfather’s day and they
posed no danger:
…perhaps they gloomily thought of the terrible scenes that might again be
enacted when myriads of scowling Catawbas should bend their bows
against New York, or sharpen their tomahawks on the steps of St.
Nicholas. We beg to reassure the dear old ladies. For, according to the
last census, there was a grand total of but 200 Catawbas-men, women, and
papooses in the whole empire of South Carolina; and, according to the
accounts whilom given of these by Carolina authorities, no very great
dangers need to be anticipated from their incursions at present.62
The “accounts whilom63 given...by Carolina authorities” were taken from
a study in 1826 by Mills in his “Statistics of South Carolina.” The New York
Times editorial used the following passage from Mills’ report to prove its point,
noting that the Catawbas were
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so addicted to the habits of indolence and intoxication that they are fast
sinking into oblivion. (Despite rents of $20 per annum from white settlers
on each 300 acres of their vast lands) these wretched Indians live in abject
poverty in consequence of their dissipated habits. They dun for their rent
before it is due. (editor’s italics) Any money received is squandered, and
they suffer for the remainder of the year in miserable poverty as beggars.
To further support its sarcastic editorial, the newspaper repeated, unchanged, the
description Mills had made of the Catawbas thirty-five years earlier:
The annual income from this source must be at least $5000, which, if
prudently managed, would soon place the Indians in a state of comfort; for
the whole number of families does not exceed 30, or about 110
individuals. These wretched Indians, though they live in the midst of an
industrious people and in an improved state of society, will be Indians
still. Let Gov. Pickens take into solemn consideration that sentence of
Mills which we have italicize, before he finally decides to enroll the
Catawbas in the grand army of South Carolina; for, with an empty treasury
and no pawnshops, what would he do with himself, should these dusty
warriors, true to their historic reputation dun him for their pay before it is
due?64
“Will be Indians still.” Those were Mill’s original words. Significantly,
whites in the North and the South shared preconceived ideas and prejudices about
the Indian. What is interesting is the blind acceptance by the editorial writer of
what Mills had written thirty-five years previously, along with his statement that
the Catawbas hadn’t collected any rent in a generation. Both sides in the new
conflict betrayed the same facile assumptions about the Indian as indolent and
drunken. The repetition of this stereotype is curious in this instance. One can
understand the editor’s desire to reassure his readers by minimizing the South’s
military threat, but the disparaging of the Catawbas is suggestive of the pervasive
view, in both the North and South, that whites were better and more deserving of
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the land and even had an obligation to make the land productive and halt the
Indians’ abuses.
Such a mindset was, of course, not unique to this place or time. In 1896
H. Lewis Scaife, a college professor at Trinity Hall in Louisville, Kentucky wrote
a monograph entitled “The History and Condition of the Catawba Indians of
South Carolina.” He also shows this pervasive impression of the Indian even in
educated men, but then relates his own experience with the Catawbas to claim that
they were an exception to the stereotype. After discussing Mills’ article, Scaife
quoted Theodore Roosevelt, who after serving as Federal Civil Service
Commissioner during which he had toured reservations in the West, remarked:
The one thing to be impressed upon the average Indian is that…above all
he must work, just as a white man does. One of the most pernicious things
that can be done is to pet too much the Indians.65
Like Scaife, Roosevelt was an educated man and someone who had experience of
the Indians of the Northeast and West. Drawing from his own experience with
the Catawba people, Scaife observed how little the Catawbas fit Roosevelt’s
description:
Mr. Roosevelt probably knows as much about the Indian character as any
man in America, and this observation is, no doubt, well founded. But as
far as the Catawba Indians are concerned it does not apply…indeed, the
Catawba present an exception to the Indian character…
The Catawba Indians have never been “petted;” they always have been
and still are mistreated and neglected. As to their condition, the writer
knows whereof he speaks, as he has often visited the tribe and has had
ample opportunity to study their condition.66
Sacife, however, was exceptional in his view that Indians were not necessarily
lazy and dissolute.
65
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What was the experience of the Catawba people in this all-consuming
conflict that was the American Civil War? Like their fellow Confederate citizens,
the war significantly affected both the soldiers and those on the home front. We
will first examine the military experience, and then the civilian response,
emphasizing in both the similarity of both to what all Southerners caught up in the
Civil War endured. The Catawbas’ experience serves as a microcosm of the
shared Confederate sacrifice and suffering.

Indeed, this idea of universality

extends to Union combatants and citizens, even to those caught in all warfare.
Our second effort will focus on the central mystery of why the Catawbas
supported the Confederate war effort at all, considering their treatment prior to
1861 by South Carolina detailed in the prologue. With this second examination
we move sharply from shared experience to a unique dynamic only the Catawbas
faced.
Two new historiographical emphases are made in this chapter. First, since
these Indian soldiers did not record their battle and war experiences, we have had
to rely on the memoirs of two white Confederate soldiers from South Carolina
who fought alongside the Catawbas. These were Edward McCrady, an officer in
the 1st SC Volunteers, who fought that day with the 12th SC (Gregg’s Brigade),
and recorded the action faced by both units at Second Manassas,67 and F.W.
McMaster, in the SC 17th Volunteers (Brig. General Stephen Elliott Jr.’s Brigade)
who gives his eye-witness account of the Battle of the Crater at Petersburg.68
Regarding the Catawba home front, it has not been explored at all; with the
exception of Thomas Blumer’s inclusion in is work of Catawba agent John R.
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Patton’s 1864 Report.69 There Blumer explores the life of the Catawbas left at
home.
Following the initial victories at Fort Sumter and then First Manassas
there was a rush throughout the Confederacy to join the cause. The Catawba
warriors were no different. The first enlistments were on December 9, 1861,
when four Catawbas entered the CSA at Charleston’s Camp Hampton. Jefferson
Ayers, William Canty, John Scott, and Alexander Timms joined Company K, 17th
South Carolina Volunteers (later Infantry). Less than two weeks later the brothers
James and John Harris enlisted with Company H, 12th South Carolina Infantry.
Over the next four years almost all of the Catawbas able for military duty joined
in small groups, serving in the three South Carolina Infantry Regiments: the 5th,
Company G; the 12th , Company H; and the 17th, Company K. By volunteering in
small groups of friends and siblings, the Catawbas reflected the recruitment
pattern throughout the Confederate States Army. Soldiers joined in personal
groupings, usually from the same town, same family or some other bond that
personally connected them to each other.70
The exact number of Catawba Confederate soldiers remains disputed, and
it will probably never be known due to incomplete or lost records. Estimates
range between seventeen and twenty Catawba men who volunteered. Thomas J.
Blumer, who lists eighteen, observed that this was the entire male population
capable of fighting.71 For Blumer the exact number is unimportant. His emphasis
is on the complete embrace and the costly sacrifice of the Catawbas in the Civil
War of the Confederate cause.
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When John Harris enlisted early in the war, he had just returned from his
journey to the Choctaw Nation, where he and Chief Allen Harris had negotiated a
new homeland for the Catawbas. John Harris immediately had begun to recruit
his people and work with South Carolina authorities to fulfill these aspirations
when the war abruptly cut short their plans and hopes. The initial Confederate
euphoria and patriotic fervor were soon replaced by the reality of war, as the
number of combat wounds and deaths mounted. John and Peter Harris were both
wounded at Antietam, where the South Carolina 12th played a crucial role. Their
wounds were noted in the October 8, 1862, edition the local York County
newspaper, the Yorkville Enquirer, which published “A list of killed and wounded
in the Battle of September 17, 1862, in Maryland,” listing as casualties from
Company H “John Harris (Indian) severely in the leg; James Harris (Indian)
slightly in the foot.” The Harris brothers were among the one hundred and two
soldier causalities from the 12th Regiment.72 Both were serving as cooks for
Company H at the start of September 1862, but with the ever-changing action of
battle, were forced into being combatants. John Harris had suffered a near-fatal
wound in his left leg and pleaded with his fellow soldiers to shoot him to prevent
capture. He was taken as a prisoner of war, one of the thousands of soldiers
captured during the Civil War.73 John Harris was more fortunate than many other
POWs. He received treatment at Union hospitals in Frederick, Maryland, and
recovered sufficiently to be exchanged in May 1863. Eventually he returned to
duty, but the wound persisted and he remained crippled for the rest of his life.74
In spite of this, John Harris served as Catawba Chief from 1869 through 1871.
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Thus, he was one of numerous disabled war veterans who served with distinction
in later civilian life.
John Harris’s brother, James, was also wounded at Antietam but less
severely, and returned to duty in early 1863. He fought at Gettysburg, and he saw
combat action at The Wilderness and Spotsylvania the following year. James
Harris survived to witness Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.75 Like
his brother John, he returned to the Catawba reservation and lived another
nineteen years to the age of forty.76
Two other Catawba Confederate volunteers spent the duration of the war
in prison camps. Peter Harris also was wounded at Antietam and then recovered
at Confederate Hospitals in Williamsburg and Farmville, Virginia. Subsequently
he served in the Petersburg trenches in defense of Richmond, where he was
captured by Union forces on April 2, 1865. He was sent to Hart’s Island in New
York City harbor and was not paroled until June 16, 1865.77 Likewise, Nelson
George was taken prisoner, most likely at the Battle of Reams Station and spent
the duration of the war in a POW camp until he was released at Charlotte, North
Carolina on May 16, 1865.
At least three Catawbas were directly killed in action. Blumer notes these
soldiers have no extant service records, but tradition identifies Franklyn Canty
and family members John and William Sanders as also having died. 78 Disease,
like combat, was a significant cause of death and disability for Civil War soldiers.
The service records of Catawba volunteers bear this out. William Canty fought at
Second Manassas, Boonsboro, and then at Antietam without wound or injury. It
was disease, not warfare, that sidelined him. Stricken at camp in Culpeper,
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Virginia, Canty was hospitalized at Richmond, suffering with a jaundice that was
probably secondary to hepatitis. Troops who had never been outside their home
area were fodder for the numerous viral and bacterial infections that ravaged war
camps. Canty recovered sufficiently enough to be discharged home at the end of
his enlistment on February 3, 1863.79
Fellow Catawba Robert Mush’s service record lists no battle engagements
or wounds, only disease. He enlisted in 1863 and his service record lists only
furloughs home to recover from illnesses.

By June of 1864, Mush was

hospitalized in Williamsburg, Virginia, with chronic diarrhea, most likely from
the rampant strains of dysentery. Unable to do anything for him, Mush was
furloughed home again, where he died shortly thereafter.80
William Canty reenlisted on March 11, 1864, this time with a different
unit. From May to June 1864 Canty saw action resisting Grant’s offensive at The
Wilderness, at Spotsylvania, and finally at Petersburg. His service record ends
abruptly on July 7, 1864.81 He was never heard from again, and there is no
official notice of his fate, although Catawba tradition has long held that he died in
combat at Petersburg.82
After enlisting together in 1862, Robert Crawford and Robert Head both
shared the fate of the thousands of Confederate soldiers who were lost in action
and presumed dead.

Robert Crawford’s service is largely unknown.

He

disappeared after December 31, 1862, in the vicinity of Fredericksburg following
the battle there, and was most likely killed in action.83

Robert Head was

furloughed home in 1863 to recover after hospitalization for “chronic diarrhea.”
He returned, but an undated notation lists him as “among the Officers and soldiers
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of the Army of the Confederate States who were killed in action or who died of
wounds or disease.”84
The Confederate service of Catawba Jefferson Ayers is particularly
poignant. He endured battlefield wounds on at least two separate occasions,
suffered from disease, was captured, and died of complications of his wounds and
disease as a POW. After enlisting with the first group of Catawba volunteers in
1861, Jefferson Ayers was wounded at Boonsboro on September 14, 1862, just
prior to Antietam. After recovering at home, Ayers served in the Petersburg
trenches and then suffered a gunshot wound to his head at Hatchers Run during
Lee’s April 1865 retreat. Straggling behind, he was captured and imprisoned at
the USA Hospital, Point Lookout, Maryland. While there he was initially treated
for his head wound, but soon the additional diagnosis of chronic diarrhea
ominously appeared on his chart. Either would have been serious, but together
these conditions proved fatal. Jefferson Ayers died on July 2, 1865. He had
served four years of warfare, only to die from his wounds and complicating
disease after the war was over. Many other soldiers died months and years after
April 1865 of disease and wounds they contracted during the war. Like countless
other Civil War soldiers, he was buried a long way from his home and family.85
Jefferson Ayers’ Civil War record also contains insights into other aspects
of a Confederate soldier’s life. On October 3, 1862, Ayers affixed his mark at
Richmond to notary Edward Scott’s printed form. In doing so he declared that he
had not been paid the $119 due him for serving since joining in December of
1861.

Only his name, unit, date, mark and Scott’s signature were filled in,

indicative of a large number of similar affidavits to require a printed form. Filing
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this legal action was the action necessary to be paid.86 In a similar pay issue, both
Nelson George and William Canty were never paid the promised enlistment
bounty.87
Undocumented stories of personal valor, exploits and sacrifice are
common to all wars, and the combatants of the Civil War, including the
Catawbas, are not exceptions.

Ann Evans has indicated that there was an

additional Catawba veteran, James Patterson, who was only twelve when he
served.

Patterson survived the war.88

Douglas Summer Brown includes a

Catawba named Billy George, who was probably the brother of Nelson George.
Although his military career is likewise shrouded in uncertainty, he is thought to
have been wounded at Gettysburg and subsequently killed at the siege of
Petersburg. However, stories survive in traditional tribal lore that he returned
home after the war.89

The only surviving artifact of the Catawbas’ actual

Confederate service is a grainy, faded photograph of Robert Head that supposedly
was taken in Rock Hill when he was absent without leave, having left to see his
newborn son.
The unselfish service of these Catawba Confederate soldiers was first
noted by Catawba Agent and advocate John R. Patton. In November 1864, he
wrote of their grim sacrifice:
All of the males Except 3 is now or have been in the Service of the
Confederate States Five of whom have died in the Service, one or Two
Discharged from Physical Disability. Two or three have been Severely
Wounded and one of them a cripple for Life.90
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The overall significance of the Catawbas’ war record is expressed by
Laurence Hauptman:
The Catawba were the most committed of all Indian groups that sided with
the Confederacy. Although the number of Catawbas in gray was not large,
it represented fully one-third of their population-at least 19 men from a
total of 60 people. This dedication stemmed from the Catawbas’
perception of themselves as Southerners as well as Indians, even though
contact with white men obviously had decimated them. They went off to
fight as “good neighbors,” having volunteered their services to South
Carolina even before the war began. And although they would be exposed
to the worst of war and practically destroyed, the Catawbas would remain
loyal to the end.91
If the Catawbas thought of themselves as good neighbors and wanted to
help the white cause, they also knew that they were not white themselves, nor that
they were like the other Southerners that volunteered.
No surviving war records specifically mention battle action by the
Catawba, and of course they never left records of their own.

But the two

regiments in which they primarily served—the 17th and the 12th South Carolina
Infantries—were engaged at many of the war’s significant conflicts. Three of
these were Second Manassas, Antietam, and Petersburg, and we have eyewitness
collaboration of the actions of these two units. This testimony is presented in an
effort to glimpse what the Catawbas experienced and endured.
Company H, 12th South Carolina Infantry was commanded by Captain
Cadwalader Jones and included men from the Rock Hill area. They were attached
to General David Maxcy Gregg’s Second Brigade, 1st Corps of the Army of
Northern Virginia.

At Second Manassas on August 29, 1862, they found

themselves in the middle of the action. Around ten on that morning, despite
Jackson’s order not to engage the enemy, Gregg advanced his Brigade and
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effectively broke through at the center of the Union line. Thereupon Union
General John Pope sent troops under Kearney to repulse this incursion. Jones
himself describes the response of his men.
Wheeling these companies again into line, the Twelfth charged in the most
gallant manner, firing as it advanced, and putting the enemy completely to
rout, pursued them with heavy slaughter through the woods and until they
crossed the field and ran out of sight…Very soon fresh column of the
enemy, probably three regiments, were seen advancing. Just at this time
the First Rifles, most opportunely, were also seen advancing through the
woods to our support. Forming a line with and on the left of this regiment,
together we gave them battle, and without much difficulty or loss again
drove back the enemy.92
Two weeks later at Antietam, the 12th was part of A.P. Hill’s Light
Division, which had just help captured Harper’s Ferry and then hurried north.
Gregg’s Brigade arrived around four in the afternoon, providing a critical
counterattack as Union forces threatened to break the Confederate right flank.
The 12th was deployed just north of the Burnside Bridge. Hiding behind a stone
wall they inflicted heavy losses directly on the 16th. Connecticut Volunteer
Infantry. Suffering more than three hundred casualties in a matter of minutes, the
Federal troops were forced to retreat.93 It was in this engagement that James and
John Harris, the two Catawbas serving in the 12that that time, were wounded.
There is other evidence of the Catawbas’ battlefield experience. The
January-February 1885 issue of the Southern Historical Society Papers published
an address by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward McCrady, Jr. McCrady’s speech was
given at Walhalla, South Carolina for a meeting of the survivors of the 12th
Regiment. In this speech he quotes Robert E. Lee concerning Second Manassas:
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General Lee in his report after mentioning a threat made on Longstreet
says:
… a large force advanced to assail the left of Jackson’s position, occupied
by the division of General A.P. Hill. The attack was received by his troops
with their accustomed steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury. The
enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on the attack with fresh
troops…General Gregg, who was most exposed, and successfully and
gallantly resisted the attack of the enemy until the ammunition of his
brigade being exhausted, and all its field officers but two killed or
wounded, it was relieved, after several hours of severe fighting.94
Catawba troops were also present at the Battle of the Crater in 1864. At
4:44 AM on July 30, 1864, miners serving in the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry at
Petersburg exploded a gaping wound, measuring 170 feet long, 60 feet wide and
30 feet deep, in the Confederate defensive works at Petersburg. Defending this
section was the 17th South Carolina Infantry, Brigadier General Stephen Elliott’s
Brigade, which included several Catawbas. This was the second Union effort in
what would be six attempts to breach the defenses, and the Catawbas
participated—and paid dearly—in helping counter each of these assaults between
July 1864 and April 1865. But the Battle of the Crater would become for “The
Indians fighting for the North and South …their bloodiest face-to-face meeting.”95
The subject of Catawba home front conditions during the Civil War has
been largely ignored by Catawba historians.

Only Thomas Blumer, quoting

Catawba Agent John Patton, makes any reference to those left behind. This is
striking in view of the attention that has been paid recently in Civil War studies to
conditions on the home front. An example is Virginia’s Private War: Feeding
Body and Soul in the Confederacy, William Blair’s recounting of the home
conditions in Civil War Virginia. In contrast, since the Catawba Nation had
94

Edward McCrady, Jr., “Gregg’s Brigade of South Carolinians in the Second Battle of
Manassas,” Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XIII, January-December, 1885, 7.
95
Hauptman, “Into the Abyss,” 48.

51

become obscure and insignificant, their domestic story is a mere footnote,
evidently not worthy of a detailed study.

There was only one literate and

concerned witness to this aspect of the Civil War for the Catawbas. Fortunately,
we are left with accurate descriptions of the Catawbas at home in Agent Patton’s
annual reports.
In January 1861, the South Carolina House resolved that only those
Catawbas actually living on the Old Reservation were to receive any portion of
that year’s support. By the fall of that year the hardship in the Nation, in large
part resulting from the war service of their prime men, had become serious. In
November a full forty white citizens of York County petitioned the Assembly,
asking for aid to the Catawbas at home:
That a number of the Catawba Indians, resident in this District, have not
shared any portion of the last appropriation made in their behalf, by reason
of their being non-residents of their Nation proper…we regard them as
possessing equal virtue and consideration…and entitled to like bounty at
your hands.96
It is unclear whether the whites of York County were totally altruistic here, or
whether self-interest was involved, since more state aid would require less help on
their part.
Also in November 1861, the newly-appointed Catawba Agent, J. R.
Patton, submitted his first Annual Report to the South Carolina Senate and House
of Representatives. He describes them as generally
very well satisfied with their present condition. They are a somewhat
indolent and careless people living in small Log Houses…scattered over a
considerable portion of the land they occupy…as a general thing they do
not make anything like a support.
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I would further say that there is still some accounts yet-unsettled in
consequence of the holders being absent in the Army. There is also a
portion of the Indians which have not Rec’d their full amounts.97
This is the first record of wretched conditions endured by the Catawbas at home at
very the start of the Civil War, and of the early, significant impact of having their
men away in service.
Just a year later, when Patton submitted his second Annual Report, he
indicated that the home situation and conditions had deteriorated markedly in only
one year of war. Patton wrote:
Many of whom are at this time in very destitute circumstances a few of
them are quite old & unable to do much for themselves. An other (sic)
portion are in great want in consequence of their Husbands being absent in
the Army nearly or quite all of them has children to support. There is
fifteen males fit for military duty Eleven of whom are now in the Service
of the Confederate States. Several of them have been wounded in the late
Battles near Sharpsburg. I would simply say to Your Honourable Body
that I visited the Tribe a few days since for the purpose of inquiring into
there condition. I asked many of them if they got plenty to eat. They
Frankly told me they did not, that they were not able…often…to procure
bread.98
In 1863, Patton emphasized the dire poverty of the Catawba at home, and
the continuous worsening food situation for them. Some, he noted, tend small
gardens and have a cow or some hogs, but
many of them have none of either. There (sic) little farms are decidedly
worse managed this year than they have ever been since I have been acting
as agent for them. Perhaps for the simple reason that nearly All the Males
are in the service of the Confederate States. The Tribe will be greatly
dependent upon the charities of the State or upon the charities of the
communities around where they live as many of them are making no
support whatever.99
97

John R. Patton, “Indian Agent’s Report for 1861,” John R. Patton Papers, Indian Affairs
Reports, 1861 and 1863. SCDAH.
98
John R. Patton, “Mr. John R. Patton, Agent for Catawba Indians, 1862, Indian Affairs Reports,”
SCDAH.
99
John R. Patton, “Report of Catawba Agent 1863,” Reports from the Folder of D.F. Rice, Indian
Affairs Reports, 1860 and 1861. SCDAH.

53

Apparently the citizens of the York District did come to the assistance of
their Catawba neighbors at this time, and it appears that Agent John R. Patton’s
personal attention was instrumental in assisting the Tribe. When Patton was
summoned to military service in 1863, both the white citizens and the Indians
petitioned Governor Banham to exempt him from service to continue his work.
The York community had interceded for the Catawba two years previously. Now
the Catawbas joined their neighbors in petitioning for help. The only previous
Catawba entreaty to any government body was to the Federal Government twenty
years before to help them in relocating to the West.
On October 10, 1863, sixteen Catawbas pleaded their case for Patton to
stay.
Owing to the necessities of our people, and the scarcity of provisions, it is
necessary to have the Agent near to us…and owing to a turbulent spirit
which prevails among many of our people, the presence of our Agent is
necessary.100
In an accompanying petition the York residents declare they know the situation of
the Indians and confirm that the conditions stated in their petition are true.
The attachment of the Indians to him (Patton) is such as to give him entire
influence over them, not only to govern their supplies, but to keep down
any difficulties which may arise.101
Patton himself wrote directly to Governor Banhom stating that he had
been exempted by the Governor and Council from military service as the bonded
agent for the Catawba. Despite this, he had been called into service, and he now
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asked the Governor to intercede “for the purpose of attending to the wants of the
Tribe.”102
Patton’s Civil War records show that he enlisted in Company K of the 5th
South Carolina State Troops at Ebenezer, on August 1, 1863, but had been
furloughed by order of Gen. Beauregard until the end of the year. Although
Patton did report on January 13, 1864, he was furloughed home one week later.
Apparently the pleas to Governor Banhom proved effective.103
On January 6, 1864, the Yorkville Enquirer had as its lead story a report of
a measure recently passed by the Legislature.

This concerned the Soldiers’

Boards of Relief; it read:
The Soldiers’ Boards of Relief …are hereby notified that, under the
requirements of the Act of December 17, 1863, entitled “An Act to make
provisions for the support of the families of soldiers from this State in the
Confederate and State services,” the amount appropriated by said Act has
been apportioned upon the basis of the white population, shown by the
census of 1859.104
The plight of those at home struggling with the war depravations had been
recognized, even if very late. However, no mention is made of inclusion of the
Catawbas in this assistance.

But Patton’s late 1864 summary captures the

Catawba home front situation at the end of the war. Most likely because of the
chaos after April, no Indian Agent report was submitted in 1865.
There has been a great deal of Sickness in the Nation during the present
year and several have died. I am at present unable to report any change in
the condition of the Tribe for the better…as a matter of course, many of
them are at Times considerably Straightened to get food enough to Satisfy
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the Natural Cravings of hunger…There is but very few who have made
anything in the way of provisions.105
Given such conditions, one wonders why the Catawbas, after nearly two
centuries of economic deprivation, mistreatment, and fraud by the whites,
continued their support of the white government by fighting for the Confederacy.
This is a crucial question, not only because of their earlier mistreatment, but
because they had no obligation to do so. The difficulty of answering that question
is complicated because the Catawba were a non-literate society at this time, and
no self-written record of their actions and aspirations, their hopes and fears, is
available. There is, however, their oral tradition, which carried the Catawbas’
experience and history from generation to generation.
Why, then, did the Catawbas so completely embrace the Confederate
cause? Hauptman summarizes four significant reasons why the Catawba, as a
sovereign nation with no obligation to fight, joined the Confederate war effort: 1)
the enlistment bounty and regular soldiers’ pay; 2) their warrior and military
tradition; 3) intimidation by white neighbors; and 4) most significantly, their
economic and psychological dependence and identity with the white power
structure of South Carolina.106 Historians have expressed differing views as to the
significance of each of these possible explanations.
The Confederacy paid up to fifty dollars as an enlistment bonus. Coupled
with the security of regular pay, this was a significant draw for the impoverished
Catawbas trying to live by subsistence farming and hunting on a mere 630 acres.
Assistance from the state was minimal. Agent Patton’s annual report for 1861
shows that a total of $888.61 had been expended on supplies and services, or
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about ten dollars a year for each tribe member. Military bonuses and pay would
have been critical to the Indians.107
The Catawba had been a warrior people throughout their existence. Much
of their personal and tribal self-identity derived from this focus. As we have seen
from Washington’s experience, they had a well-earned reputation as fierce and
loyal combatants. From the beginnings of the Carolina Colony in the 1670s, they
had allied themselves with the white settlers. The first significant threat to
Carolina came in 1670 from another local tribe.
Efforts to keep the Westo out of the colony reached the state of open
warfare. The friendly Catawba had been approached in this first war of
any consequence in which the colony was engaged. They would be
approached again and again as the settlers took root and the nation took
form.108
The only exception to white loyalty occurred in 1715, when the Catawbas joined
the Yamasee War against the colonists over trade and land grievances.
In addition to this alliance with South Carolina, the Nation had a longer
history of conflict with other tribes. The height of their military power was in the
first half of the 18th century, when they waged almost unrelenting war against
their primary rivals, the powerful Iroquois and Cherokee.

These conflicts

continued in the French and Indian War, known as the Cherokee War to the
Catawba, and during the Revolution, when the Catawba continued the bitter feud
with the Iroquois. A strong military consciousness and tradition was central to the
Catawbas.
The third possible factor, white coercion, is controversial.

Douglas

Summers Brown suggests that this was a significant motivation for the Catawba.
She notes that Frank Speck, a cultural anthropologist at the University of
107
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Pennsylvania who studied the Catawbas extensively from 1913 through 1950,
reported that several tribal members had related to him that they had been
threatened with death if they failed to enlist.109 Hauptman, however, faults this
explanation:
Although South Carolina-Catawba relations were often tense and the state
frequently attempted to remove the Indians, the explanation given to
Speck appears to be a concocted postwar rationale for Catawba
involvement in the Civil War. The Catawba had an outstanding military
record, one that can’t simply be rationalized by “impressment” into the
South’s military service.110
Blumer also argues that the Catawba enlistments were in five separate small
enlistment groups spaced over three and one half years, which does not seem to
suggest a pattern of coercion.

However, in talking with present-day tribal

members this subject brings a smile of doubt. There remains a deeply held
tradition that perceived threats were at least a motivating factor in the enlistments.
Perhaps the fourth possible explanation, the interconnection and
interaction with both white and black South Carolina, has the most significance in
providing insight into the Catawba situation.

Hudson’s examination of the

declining status of the Catawba in the pluralistic Southern plantation society
captures their plight as the Civil War approached. That society was increasingly
polarized between white and black, with the Catawba and other Indians caught in
the middle. Hudson’s “obscure enclave” of Catawbas was thus confronted with
an identity crisis: “They faced a dilemma: were they to be a race or a nation?”111
No longer a Nation, when forced to choose which of the two races in biracial
South Carolina they were to be identified with, they chose the white one.
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The great other in that social network were the blacks, and by identifying
with the white power faction, the Catawba both saw and positioned themselves as
distinct from the slaves or freedmen. What had started in colonial times as
economic dependency had now evolved to include psychological dependence on
South Carolina as well. Hauptman credits this identity and dependence on South
Carolina as the cause of the Catawbas’ support of the Confederacy:
In this respect, they had much in common with poor Confederate recruits,
who owned no slaves but nevertheless identified with the “Stars and
Bars.” The Catawba could not match the power of the planter class.
Although they were considered to be on a lower plain in the social
hierarchy of the South than their poor white neighbors, both groups saw
themselves as distinct, more powerful, and superior to local blacks, slave
or free. As “good neighbors,” each deferred to the leadership of the
planter class, their so-called “betters” on whom they were dependent.112
Being “good neighbors,” or “casting their lot with the home state as they
had (always) done”113 as Blumer describes it, is different than the idea that in this
war they were now trying to keep their identity as a distinct race. Their physical
survival had been threatened for generations, but now their existence as a people
was precarious: in the period before the Civil War they were losing their separate
Indian identity and becoming people of color. This thesis argues that the specific
root cause for this unqualified support was the Catawbas’ identity with white
South Carolina, since this preserved their status as a distinct race, which now was
in great peril. Survival for the Catawbas after 1800 meant it was necessary to
show identity with the white majority that supported them, and therefore to
separate themselves from the black slaves and freedmen. The ultimate support
would be sacrificing their lives to sustain the Confederacy’s avowed racial views.
They weren’t white, but they were not black either, and had a different
112
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relationship with the dominant race of South Carolina. The Catawbas’ continued
existence as a distinct people depended on this specific psychological identity and
dependence on white South Carolina. Further examination of the Catawbas’
changing relationship with the blacks, and their eventual embrace of Christianity,
are both significant factors that lend support for this thesis.
The Catawbas’ complex relationship with blacks dated back two centuries.
Tribal members were the third, and definitely the minor, race in a predominately
biracial society.

The Catawbas’ viewpoint was also conditioned by their

interaction with both the concept and the actual institution of slavery itself. In
colonial times the Catawba served as slave hunters, tracking, capturing, and
returning runaway slaves for bounty. As such they controlled the slaves, even if
temporarily, and unlike the slaves, they had bargaining power with the whites.
Significantly, even then, more than one hundred years before John Brown,
Carolinians feared slave uprisings aided by outside help, especially a combined
slave-Indian insurrection.
Making a plantation colony in a frontier setting, the Carolinians feared that
their African slaves might combine with defiant Indians to merge slave
rebellion with frontier war-a combination almost certainly fatal to the new
Colony. The colony needed, at a minimum, to keep the Africans and the
Indians apart. Ultimately, the colonists hoped to pit the Africans against
the Indians, the better to exploit both.114
The Catawbas also had the experience of being slaves themselves,
captured and carried into servitude by other tribes.

Indian warfare had for

centuries involved taking prisoners who were forced into slavery by their captors.
However, some tribes, including both the Iroquois and Catawba, had a different
need for captives. As the result of their prolonged conflict, large losses of young
warriors were sustained on both sides. A few captives became not slaves but
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replacement tribal members, being adopted into the captor Indian society to
replace those tribal members lost. Often raids were made with this express goal
and were known as mourning wars. The Catawba before 1800 had both Indian
slaves and mourning adoptees.
In the French and Indian War, the Catawba saw first-hand their British
allies giving supportive whites and Indians captured Cherokee warriors to be used
as slaves. This graphic experience of seeing Indians used as slaves was not lost
on the Catawba. They had seen it earlier too, when white traders sometimes took
Indians to be sold as slaves. Distancing and distinguishing themselves from the
black slaves became paramount. The Catawbas’ increasing diminution in the
biracial society of South Carolina after 1800 was the major factor fueling their
changed views on blacks. The Catawba found themselves both isolated from their
fellow Indians and dismissed by the white majority. They faced the ever-growing
specter of being considered on the same level as slaves.

Perhaps most

significantly we have the words of the people themselves at this juncture in their
struggle. “We have no home…” the Catawbas said in a petition to the South
Carolina Legislature in 1844, “we feel lost without a home.”115
With Secession, the Choctaw plan and any hopes of the Catawbas to
escape their social quandary in South Carolina abruptly ended. They were now
forced to find a place, to make their stand, where they were. By joining the
Confederacy, they declared their choice: the white majority over the ignominy
and shame of being considered dark-skinned, inferior, even as potential slaves.
In 1984, James H. Merrell traced this racial education of the Catawba in
The Journal of Southern History. His arguments appear to be compelling and
historically sound. The Catawbas’ perception of the increasing black population
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changed dramatically over time, conditioned by their concurrent evolving
relationship with the whites. “In order to understand the origins and development
of this relationship,” Merrell writes, “it is necessary to venture into the cultural
frontier where Indian met African.”116 From the first white contact in 1540
through about 1800, geographical remoteness limited Catawba contact with
explorers, traders, and finally the coastal plantation society. When contact did
occur, the Catawba responded in seemingly contradictory ways, displaying both
prejudice and tolerance. But Merrell argues that this seemingly contradictory
response of the Indians to the blacks at this early time should not be unexpected.
At that time the tribe controlled the interior; outsiders were all collectively “the
other,” whether English, Spanish, African, or French.
These dynamics drastically changed in the early 1800s when the
burgeoning cotton economy directly invaded the Catawbas’ Piedmont homeland.
For the first time they observed directly the master-slave relationship. In 1800,
seeing a black person on the Catawba 144,000-acre tract would be extremely rare.
By 1840, over two thousand blacks “lived on the Catawba land as slaves of white
people who rented the Indians’ land.” According to Merrell, “settlement of the
Piedmont lifted the curtain shielding Catawbas from American culture. For the
first time talk of black inferiority must have reached Catawba ears as their white
neighbors began to articulate a powerful and pervasive racial philosophy in the
early nineteenth century.”117 Blacks were to be feared and avoided, lest the
Catawbas became equated with the slaves in the white power structure’s eyes.
Thus, Merrell agrees with Hudson that the Catawbas were the minority third race
caught in the racial dynamics in the new cotton-slave economy. Merrell expands
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on Hudson’s foundation by elaborating on the origin and consequences of the
Catawbas’ precarious status.
By 1800 then, Catawbas had become an anomaly. Neither useful or
dangerous, neither black nor white, they did not fit into the South’s
expanding biracial society. To make matters worse, white fears of an
Indian-black alliance faded and were replaced by a propensity to lump
native Americans with Afro-Americans in a great “colored” underclass.
No official policy arose that forced Catawbas to become blacks; but in a
culture that recognized only two colors, the danger was always present,
and the Catawbas became acutely sensitive to it.118
A parallel might be drawn with the Lost Cause mystique of the defeated
Confederacy. Although vanquished by 1865, the Confederacy’s military legacy
endured and was a significant dynamic after the Civil War for both veterans and
citizens. That legacy was preserved by Civil War remembrance ceremonies and
organizations, and the continuation of the military tradition in Southern education.
The Spanish-American War served as the opportunity for the former Confederates
to demonstrate their commitment to fully rejoining the United States. A similar
dynamic can be seen with regards to the Catawbas’ total commitment to the
Confederacy in 1861. Proving their martial skill and attempting to forge stronger
bonds in their estranged relationship with South Carolina, the Catawbas
anticipated the same impulse that the former Confederates showed thirty-seven
years later in the Spanish-American War.
Another possibility that could have occurred to the Catawbas in 1861 was
the potential reward for their service and loyalty, the precedent being the 1763
land grant after the Cherokee War. In 1861, the Catawba might have felt, along
with the rest of the South, a cautious optimism that their war for independence
could succeed. In that eventuality they would be in on the beginning of the new
nation.
118
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possible political gains or improved status would make their service worthwhile
and especially distinguish them from the slaves. No proof exists for this but the
early optimism of the people of the Confederacy.
The Catawba Civil War soldiers were a part of the estimated twenty
thousand American Indians who participated in the Civil War. These Native
Americans served in both the Union armed services and those of the CSA. The
families of those in the Confederate service suffered hardship and deprivation like
the civilians of the South.

However, unlike the Catawba who served the

Confederacy unswervingly, the other Southeastern Indian combatants and
civilians showed a more nuanced reaction in that epic North-South conflict.
The Cherokee people in western North Carolina were the tribe most
similar to the Catawbas. Most of the Appalachian Cherokee were removed under
the Treaty of New Echota in 1835, a part of the Trail of Tears.119 Those that
remained were the same Cherokee who offered refugee to the Catawbas
immediately after 1840. They were known as the Oconaluftee Cherokee since
their main encampment was at Quallatown, on the Oconaloftee River. Today,
they are known as the Eastern Band of the Cherokee. Article 12 of the New
Enchota Treaty had provided that those Cherokees who wished to remain would
receive annuities provided they became citizens of the state in which they resided.
At a period when no Indians enjoyed citizenship, this was thus impossible.
These North Carolina Cherokee had a strong advocate and protector in
Colonel William Holland Thomas, however. Born at Waynesville in 1805, his
Revolutionary War father had died just before Thomas’s birth, and he was
adopted by Cherokee Chief Yonaguska, who essentially became his surrogate
father. Taught the Cherokee language and culture, Thomas had the Cherokee
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name Wil-Usdi, or “Little Will.” Thomas built a prosperous trading company and
acquired wide landholdings. He also read law, and in 1830 became attorney for
these Cherokee and served as their agent during the Removal period.

His

advocacy for his people continued to the end of his life. In the North Carolina
Legislature from 1848 through 1861, he tirelessly fought for their assistance and
citizenship.
Thomas was one of only three legislators chosen as delegates to North
Carolina’s secessionist convention, where that state left the Union on May 20,
1861.

He then returned home to raise a company of mountain white and

Cherokee soldiers.

At peak enrollment, this force numbered twenty-eight

hundred, including over four hundred Cherokees and was known as Thomas’s
Legion of Indians and Highlanders. Their contribution to the Confederate War
effort was crucial.

From 1862 on they controlled the mountain passes into

Confederacy, effectively stopped Union spying and enlistment efforts in the area,
and enforced the Confederate Conscription Act. Thus they secured the Eastern
theater of the South.120

On May 9, 1865, the Thomas Legion was the last

Confederate unit east to surrender east of the Mississippi. Eastern Cherokee
historian John R. Finger emphasizes Thomas’s lifelong efforts:
Without his assistance (the Cherokee) would never have remained in
North Carolina. Without his constant support they would never have
acquired the lands they were fighting to retain. Despite a normal measure
of shortcomings, he was the best friend the Indians ever had.121
Unlike the Catawbas however, North Carolina Cherokee military support
for the Confederacy was not unanimous. An estimated thirty of them served in
the Federal forces. Some deserted after being captured as prisoners of war, while
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others did not support slavery.

The Tennessee-North Carolina border area

contained many who were sympathetic to the Northern cause, as there were in
other areas of Appalachia. The plantation-cotton economy that required slavery
was almost non-existent in this section of the Southeast and full white support for
the Confederacy was thus much attenuated.

The Cherokees’ splitting their

support between the Union and the Confederacy was therefore consistent with
that of their white neighbors. The hostility engendered between the loyalist and
rebel factions was a disruptive force in the Eastern Band’s efforts to reunite after
the war.122
Still, other Southeastern Indians spurned Confederate pressures and, while
not joining the Union Army, militarily aided the Federal forces. The growing
states’ rights movement in the antebellum South was a hallmark of the journey to
Southern nationalism. Like the slaves, Native Americans deeply felt the racist
treatment that was part of this movement. In 1835, after Nat Turner’s revolt,
North Carolina’s Constitutional Convention defined Indians also as “persons of
color,” and subsequent legislation stripped them of their rights, including those of
property ownership and bearing arms.

Virginia also passed increasingly

restrictive laws reducing the status of free Negroes and Indians. By 1843, the
Indians’ homelands were threatened. 123 This increasing subjugation by the white
supremacist power structure of both these states resulted in Native Americans
having no reason to support the Confederacy.
When Union General George B. McClellan moved toward Richmond
during the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, the Pamunkey Indians, part of the
Powhatan Indian Empire in Virginia, willingly served the Union as noncombatant
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pilots for land transport and warships.

Their knowledge of their homeland,

especially around West Point, Virginia, enabled them to serve as Federal scouts.
At least fourteen Virginian Powhatans were documented guides and pilots for the
Union forces. Of these, the exploits of Terrill Bradby are best known. Bradby
was the principal subject of anthropologist James Mooney in his study of the
Virginia Indians in the 1890s.124 Bradby served first as a Union land guide in the
Peninsula Campaign, and even worked with Pinkerton’s Secret Service. In 1863,
he enlisted in the United States Navy where he was a pilot in the North Atlantic
Blocking Squadron. Bradby was even awarded a Union pension to assist in his
post-war life back in Virginia.125
A similar Union sentiment was evident in North Carolina. The Lumbee
Indians lived in Eastern North Carolina. A rail line connected this area directly to
the lower Cape Fear River.

During the Civil War, this was the site of the

Confederacy’s greatest military engineering endeavor. A system of forts was
built around Wilmington, a crucial port. Most important was Fort Fisher, which
was not captured until January of 1865. These defensive structures were the focus
of the Confederate impressments of slaves, free blacks, and Indians. Almost
every able Lumbee was forced to go to Wilmington.

Impressment helped

coalesce and harden their dislike of the racist treatment they had endured. Some
of the Lumbee fled to the surrounding swamps, where they met with Union Army
escapees from area Confederate prison camps to form a guerilla band. From 1864
on these guerrillas harassed the North Carolina Home Guard in that area, which
enforced the repressive policies that angered them.

Eighteen-year-old Henry

Berry Lowry was their leader. The Lowry Band found itself directly in the path
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of Sherman as he invaded the Carolinas in early 1865. When Sherman entered
North Carolina on March 8, 1865, the Lowry Band aided his Grand Army of the
West as it advanced through the swamps in heavy spring rains, which was, as
Sherman himself described it, the “damnest marching I ever saw.”126
Lowry and his band were to keep on fighting long after 1865. They turned
their insurgent tactics against the racist white rule of the Reconstruction. Lumbee
historian and educator Adolph Dial has written of Henry Berry Lowry’s
significance to his people:

“Henry Berry Lowry…While that name meant

lawlessness and terror to the white community, it meant more truly a man who
fought oppression to the Indians. The ’King’ became a folk hero to his people, a
symbol of pride and manhood.

Today, in honor of their outlaw-hero, the

Lumbees annually give the Henry Berry Lowry Award to the citizen who best
exemplifies the highest standard of service to the community.”127
The relocated Civilized Tribes were not spared from the devastation of the
Civil War that ravaged their former homelands. Beginning in Missouri with the
Battle of Wilson’s Creek in August 1861, just two weeks after First Manassas,
until the fighting at Second Cabin Creek in the Indian Territory on September 19,
1864, fifteen significant engagements were waged in or near the Indian Territory.
A major reason for this heightened activity was the Territory’s location just south
of bloody Kansas, a key state for the Union and where the fighting was bitter
between supporters of both Union and Confederate causes. Like the rest of
Americans, the former Southeastern tribes were forced to choose an allegiance.
Once again, in contrast to the Catawbas, both the North and the South had Indian
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military support in this region. For the Cherokee Nation in the West, a tribal civil
war erupted in the events and pressures of 1861-1865.
In the first half of 1861, the Confederacy made persistent and persuasive
overtures to all the Civilized Tribes, in large measure due to the skills of their
negotiator Albert Pike. In July, the Creeks, Choctaws, and the Chickasaws signed
treaties with the Confederate States of America, transferring their loyalty and
allegiance to the Southern cause. Equally significant were both the offensive and
defensive military alliances forged with the CSA. These agreements signified an
abandonment of the Federal government cause in the war. Union loyalists were
prominent in both the Creek and Cherokee Nations, but their influence failed to
command the tribes’ support for the United States. How these dynamics unfolded
was telling about the condition and mindset of those Indians at this critical
juncture.
Part of the Southern allegiance had to do with slavery, as many of the
tribal leaders of the Creeks and Cherokee were themselves slaveholders. Thus,
they felt a kinship with the Confederate cause and were economically vested in
slavery like the planters. In its February 7, 1861, Choctaw Council Resolution,
the tribe stated its intent to join the South. This represented, according to the
Resolution, “the natural affections, education, institutions, and interests of our
people, which indissolubly bind us in every way to the destiny of our neighbors
and brethren of the Southern states.”128
But the major reason for Indian support of the Confederacy was the
widespread perception that the Federal government had abandoned them. In their
new lands, the national government was their protector and life source. It was not
a matter so much of what the Confederates did to court the Indians as it was the
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failure of the administrations in Washington to support tribal members.

In

particular, at this time the new Republican administration’s fervent anti-slavery
stand sent shock waves through the slave-holding leaders of those tribes, much as
it did through the Southern planter class. The relocated Indians feared a Federal
invasion and occupation of their new homelands. The bitter process of relocation
and its cost to the Indians by previous administrations left equally bitter memories
and feelings toward those in power in Washington.

These emotions were

reinforced by Washington’s failure to honor its treaty obligations.

Early

Confederate military successes in the Indian Territory and Lincoln’s withdrawal
from Territory military posts in May 1861 in order to protect Washington, D.C.
and the Border States, left the Indian Nations feeling utterly abandoned. All of
these factors were exploited by Pike. It was the United States that the tribal
members felt threatened by, not the Confederacy.
Opothleyahola, an influential Creek chief, had been a strong unionist,
urging his people to support the Union cause and efforts.

In late 1861, he

organized a band of Creek loyalists and together they set out to a promised
protective fort in Kansas, with no Federal escort. In this effort, a Confederate
cavalry force of three regiments of Indians pursued them from all Five Civilized
Tribes. In three engagements between November 19 and December 26, 1861, the
first Civil War fighting in Indian Territory, Opothleyhola’s people suffered severe
death and causalities. They straggled into Kansas finding an unprepared fort,
scarce food and supplies, and the winter upon them.

The estimated seven

thousand Creek loyalist refugees who survived were placed in a refugee camp,
where starvation and the winter weather took another heavy toll. Conditions got
no better over the next three years, as the Creeks became victims of political
disputes and graft in both Kansas and Washington. In 1864, they were marched
back to the Indian Territory and essentially left there.
70

Opothleyahola was

understandably bitter.

He wrote to Lincoln that the “Great White Father”

(Lincoln and his predecessors) had broken pledges to his people for years. They
had been promised “in our new homes, we should be defended from all
interference from any people, and that no white people in the whole world should
ever molest us unless they came from the sky. We do not hear from you. The
Government represented by our Great White Father at Washington has turned
against us.”129
John Ross, the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation in the West, also
harbored strong pro-Union feelings. Ross initially pursued a policy of neutrality
for his people. The combination of Confederate pressure and lack of Union
support that unfolded in 1861 doomed this policy, and he was forced to sign an
alliance treaty with the Confederacy on October 7. The internal conflict between
the pro-Southern and pro-Union factions in the Cherokees had its origin in the
Removal of the 1830s and the Treaty of New Enchota of 1835. At that time, the
Cherokee adamantly opposed to removal were led by John Ross and his
followers.

Supporting removal was the Treaty Party, a faction led by the

Cherokee Ridge family. In spite of the opposition of a majority of Cherokee, the
Treaty Party signed the Treaty of New Enchota, paving the way for Federal
forceful removal and the Trail of Tears. A bitter, deadly feud between these two
groups ensued that lasted for ten years in their new homeland. Ross’s supporters
murdered the Ridge family members who had signed the Treaty, and leadership of
the pro-removal Ridge faction passed to Stand Watie. Intramural atrocities and
reprisals continued until Ross and Watie signed the Treaty of 1846. It recognized
the right of Ross’s party to own land in the Cherokee Nation, pardoned those on
both sides for any crimes, and set one government for all the Cherokee western
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lands and peoples. Under John Ross’s leadership the Cherokee prospered over
the next fifteen years as agriculture and population thrived in the new lands.
The internal conflict between Ross followers and those of Stand Watie,
however, was never far below the surface. With the outbreak of the Civil War
these wounds reopened. Ross wanted to continue his Nation’s ties with the
Federal government. Stand Watie was a major slaveholder, although few of his
followers were, and supported the Confederacy. Watie was successfully courted
by Pike and became a colonel in the Confederate Army. By July of 1861, even
before all of the Confederacy alliances were signed, Watie was recruiting and
training his Civilized Tribe warriors in the Indian Territory. It was his Cherokee
Mounted Rifles who inflicted the causalities on Opothleyahola and his followers
as they fled to Union refuge in Kansas. Watie’s units were major combatants in
many other Trans-Mississippi battles and his military career achieved two
distinctions. He was the only Indian to attain the rank of Brigadier General in
either army. He was also the last Confederate general to surrender his army at
Doaksville, Choctaw Nation, on June 23, 1865, three months after Appomattox.130
John Ross and his supporters defected to the Union Army and its protection after
the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862. John Ross himself eventually spent the
War in Washington, D.C. He was technically under house arrest as a prisoner of
war, but was able to confer with Lincoln on Indian affairs. His intervention was
key in the eventual release of the Cherokees from refugee status in Kansas.
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The previous chapter demonstrates the singularity of the Catawbas among
Southeastern Indians as having no Federal component in their relocation efforts,
being solely dependent on their home state. In the Civil War, that uniqueness
continued, as they were the only Southern Indian people to give total and
unfaltering support to the Confederacy.
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CHAPTER III
1866-1890—RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY
If the Catawbas had hoped for recognition or reward in return for their
loyal service to the Confederacy, they were disappointed. In most ways, the years
following the Civil War were a harsh continuation of the status quo. The entire
South was devastated by the costs of the war. In its aftermath the Catawbas
struggled like all other Southerners—merely to survive. Just as for their former
compatriots, the loss of so many young men as heads of families and wage
earners precipitated drastic social and economic changes. These practical realities
demanded and captured everyone’s attention and the Nation found itself
struggling to survive in even harsher economic conditions than in antebellum
times. But as historians have often remarked, the Catawbas had been survivors
throughout their long history.
In the post-war period of 1866-1880, many of the same themes we have
noted previously were continued by the Catawbas and the various white groups
that impacted their lives. As with organic systems, these common threads would
grow and change.

The Nation’s members continued and strengthened their

agency, especially going directly to the Federal and State governments to present
their needs. This willingness to initiate their voice in their affairs, which had been
done previously with white help, now took an independent course. Significantly,
there also would be continuing indications of support and recognition during these
dark times from their white neighbors, even if in non-monetary forms. This
would continue to contrast with the abandonment of tribal citizens by “official”
South Carolina and those who did not know the Catawbas. Some previous themes

would also return, but with new twists. The struggle to hold the Tribe together in
South Carolina would continue. Emigration resumed, but the scattering of the
Catawbas would now involve individuals and small family groups across the
entire United States. Also reemerging after Appomattox was the Catawba effort
to find redress for the unkept promises of the Treaty of 1840. Racism would
continue and find a surprising new focus. The Catawbas continued their efforts to
distinguish themselves from the former slaves. Now, for the first time, those
endeavors would include the embrace of a white religion. As with the 1840-1860
period, we can break down these years by using the changing political control of
South Carolina as our chronological marker:

the immediate war aftermath,

Reconstruction, and finally from 1877 forward.
What political control existed immediately after April 1865 was primarily
military. Abrupt changes meant chaos to all South Carolinians, the Catawbas
included. The conditions endured by the Catawbas were captured by their agent,
John R. Patton. For the six years, from 1861 through 1866, he had been their
advocate, continually providing for their needs and maintaining close personal
contact. Patton had gained the Indians’ trust so completely that his ability to keep
affairs settled within their community led Governor Banham to exempt him from
military service so that he could continue his work. For reasons that are unclear,
Patton resigned as agent in 1866.

Patton’s last report in 1866 was a grim

evaluation of their situation.
Their condition has not materially changed since his last communication
to the General Assembly, except that their number is steadily decreasing,
and those now remaining are in great destitution and want of all the
necessities of life. Only about sixty or seventy souls now remain of the
once powerful tribe of the Catawbas. During the present year some of
them attempted to cultivate a part of the lands…and make crops of grain
for subsistence, but owing to the long continued drought and want of rain
the yield has been very inconsiderable. The appropriation made at the last
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regular session of the General Assembly for the support of said Indians
during the present year was not received by the agent until the making up
of his report.131
The “sixty to seventy souls” of 1866 compares with eighty-eight in 1840,
a post-war decrease immediately of thirty percent.132 As before, state assistance
would clearly be crucial factor for the destitute Catawbas.

But with

Reconstruction, would de facto Federal control over the South Carolina
government benefit the Catawbas? Would the new regime take active measures
to correct Catawba injustices, as it would do for the former slaves?
Prewar levels of state support through 1850 varied between $1800 to
$2500. By the mid-1850s, it had fallen to $1200-$1500. During the first two
years of the Civil War, it was still $1200. Significantly, but not surprisingly,
direct South Carolina payments to assist the Catawbas disappeared after 1862.
From 1863 until Patton’s 1866 Report, there is no mention of any appropriation
for the Catawba. Finally, in 1867, $1200 was again earmarked.133 But by 1868,
with the advent of Republican control the Reconstruction in state government, aid
was again reduced to $600.
Reconstruction

in

1877,

the

For the succeeding years up to the end of
appropriation

averaged

$750

per

year.

Reconstruction assistance was significantly less than that provided by the
antebellum state government. The tribe lost about fifty to sixty-seven percent of
its prewar aid. The Catawbas thus did not benefit from Federal dominance of
South Carolina in the immediate period after the Civil War.

The almost

neglectful approach of all state regimes toward tribal members continued.
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The human side of this problem was shown by the petitions of the
Catawba to better their condition during these years. These pleas fleshed out their
needs in their own words. In the twenty-five years between 1840 and 1865, the
Catawbas submitted only two petitions: one was to the Federal government for
relocation assistance, the other to South Carolina to retain John Patton. In the
next eleven years (1866-1877), however, they would submit no fewer than eight,
a telling difference.
These petitions centered primarily on the actions of the Catawba Indian
agents, as tribal members sometimes asked for a new agent, or raised doubts
about the present one. Equally impressive was the large number of supporting
petitions by the white citizens of York and Lancaster counties. Perhaps this was
in gratitude for the tribe’s Civil War sacrifices. As we have seen, the only
previous petitions by local residents were submitted during the War itself, trying
to include the tribe in any state assistance. After the war, at least six petitions
were either submitted by the whites or co-authored with the Catawbas.

In

addition, the local legislators serving in Columbia significantly stepped up their
support for the Catawba cause, helping to keep the attention of the state
government on the Nation.134
These Catawba petitions began very soon after the end of the Civil War.
The first, in November 1866, to Governor Orr and the Senate, requested that
Thomas Whitesides be appointed to succeed Patton.135 The Catawba voice was
heard. By 1867, Whitesides was writing to Orr that the Catawbas were destitute
because Whitesides hadn’t been able to secure the appropriated funds for their
behalf. He wrote:
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Heretofore the Agent reported to the Court, and the Court to the
Legislature, (that) some families of the Indians are at this time in a very
destitute condition, and it is not in my power to assist them. I hope Your
Excellency will advise or devise some means of relieving their necessities.
I do not know under existing circumstances how or whether the
appropriation made by the State can be obtained.136
Apparently appropriation and actual payment had become two separate issues.
The next petition, in February 1868, came from W. J. Clawson, a local
white citizen of York County, who wrote directly to Governor Orr that many of
the Catawba were starving and needed funds immediately.137 It was at this time
that concerns with the agents began. Orr answered Clawson by stating that he
appreciated the Catawbas’ extreme condition, but he also questioned Whitesides’
good faith and called for an investigation.

Whitesides had failed to submit

receipts, and Orr admonished him to keep better records, emphasizing that the
Indians needed to be protected from fraud.

Orr withheld one half of the

Catawbas’ $1200 appropriation. They thus paid the price for his alleged poor
paperwork, and soon afterwards, Whitesides resigned. By mid-July 1868, now
Governor R. H. Scott received another petition directly from the Catawba Council
requesting the appointment of James Morrow to replace Whitesides. In early
1869, the York and Lancaster delegations also strongly supported this
recommendation by the Indians. Both were rebuffed when Scott named P. J.
O’Connell.138 Douglas Summers Brown argues that Whitesides was an honest
and caring agent, whereas O’Connell was not.
During Reconstruction, Agent Thomas Whitesides, who had once
furnished the Catawbas from his private funds when the state was in
arrears, was replaced by “a corrupt and unprincipled” Irishman O’Connell.
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The Indians claimed the Carpetbagger appointee withheld their
allowances; however he was not removed or disciplined, as South
Carolina was in the throes of Reconstruction.139
Once again, South Carolina’s Reconstruction government was not benefiting the
Nation’s citizens.
O’Connell’s First Annual Report in 1870 was accepted by the Legislature,
but his Report of 1871 contained accounting irregularities. Very soon thereafter,
Governor Scott received two concurrent petitions from the Catawba Council and
the citizens of York County requesting that O’Connell be replaced. 140
Additionally, Chief John Harris, a Civil War veteran, went to Columbia in 1871 to
inform Governor Scott of the tribe’s concerns about O’Connell. This marked the
first time the Catawbas had personally lobbied in support of their wishes. That
visit was reinforced with the Petition of 1872, in which the entire Catawba
Council strongly restated their misgivings that had not been addressed:
We the subscribers of the Catawba Nation respectfully prayeth that your
Excellency do grant or appoint Solomon Harris of Lancaster County…to
be and act as our Agt. to see that we are not trespassed upon and to protect
us in every respect. If his Excellency remembers last July our Chief John
Harris was down to see you, and his Excellency promised to remove our
present Agt. If he did not act right, which we are sorry to say he has not
done. Our object in asking for Mr. Harris is because he is a good citizen,
and a Republican in politics.141
Finally, in December of 1872, P. J. O’Connell resigned. Immediately, the
local legislators wrote the new Governor, F. J. Moses, requesting that M. L.
Owens replace O’Connell. Apparently Owens proved just as flawed, for within a
year, both the Catawbas and the white citizens of York and Lancaster demanded
his removal for failing to distribute to the Catawbas the funds appropriated for
139
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them by the Legislature. And once again no action was taken. In 1874, the
Catawba Council repeated their entreaties to Governor Moses concerning both
O’Connell and Owens. The Indian headsmen alleged that Agent O’Connell had
not passed along $1500 appropriated in 1871, and $800 in 1872. In 1873, they
charged that new Agent Owens had given them only $40 of total of $500 set aside
that year for their use. They recommended the replacement of Owens by William
Whyte, someone they trusted.142 But once more, for the fourth time in five years,
an appointee other that the one recommended by the Catawba and the whites was
named. R. L. Crook became Catawba Agent.143
The end of Reconstruction came when Congress enacted the Compromise
of 1877. The election of Wade Hampton, former Confederate general and hero,
was the defining event of Reconstruction in South Carolina. This shift was a
symbolic marker of Redemption: the rightful return of their State government to
South Carolinians, a celebration of the spirit of the Lost Cause, and a conquering
hero for South Carolina. For the Catawbas, the question was whether conditions
would be better for them with these milestone changes of 1877. Many themes
already examined in the Reconstruction era continued into this new time.
Additionally, significant new ones appeared.
The Nation’s citizens continued to raise their own voices in the state
affairs that concerned them. Hampton had barely taken office in May 1877 when
yet another petition came from the Catawbas. In it they raised the hardship for the
tribe under dishonest agents, and again asked that William Whyte be appointed.
We the undersigned Catawba Indians of York County do most respectfully
petition your Honorable Bodies to remove from office, as Agent, R. L.
Crook, Esquire, of Rock Hill, because he has not treated us as we should
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have been treated; 2nd, Because he has not distributed our funds
appropriated by the state in a just and equitable manner.144
Whyte was appointed and served to 1882, when he was succeeded by A.
E. Smith, who served into the late 1890s. Thus, in the last twenty-three years of
the century (post-Reconstruction), there again was continuity of leadership. In
1877, stability and continuity were reestablished, but funding did not improve. It
remained stagnant at $800 per year over the next thirty-five years.145 This amount
would not have been sustaining even with normal economic pressures, much less
the accelerated inflation suffered by the South in the aftermath of the War.
An accurate reflection of the Catawbas’ condition and life at this time can
be found in the 1880 Federal census. Before 1880, the Nation had not been
enumerated in the national census, since their status was considered as “Indians
not taxed.” That first official count listed only sixty Indian people living in
Catawba Township, York County, South Carolina. Close reading of that 1880
census produces some telling observations. The sixty surviving tribal members
now lived in only thirteen houses on their essentially nonproductive tract of 630
acres. When noted, farmer (or farmhand) and keeping house or washerwoman
were the only occupations listed for the Catawba men and women. The age of the
heads of household varied from eighteen to thirty, with most in their early
twenties. The exceptions to this youthful demographic were directly connected
with the Civil War service of tribal members. They were Peter Harris (age 49),
Alec Tims (age 40), and the widow Sarah Head (age 37). Peter Harris had been
wounded at Antietam then captured at Petersburg.

He had spent the war’s

duration as a POW at New York. Alexander Timms had been wounded at Second
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Manassas, then defended Petersburg. Robert Head had succumbed to wounds and
disease.146
Another glimpse of the Catawba situation at this juncture can be seen in
the journals of Albert S. Gatschet, a writer.

In 1881, Gatschet visited the

Catawbas in York County and wrote of his visit:
I reached the settlement of the Kata’ba Indians on the Western side of the
Catawba River. They now…inhabit an area of one square mile in the
middle of the woods. Of this area they have under cultivation not quite
one half, on which they raise Indian corn, potatoes, and chiefly cotton.
Their dwellings are log huts of one room each, with two doors, a rock or
wood chimney, and no windows.147
This mirrors the 1840 description by the Nations Ford Treaty negotiators, and also
John Patton’s grim assessment in 1866. The Catawbas had gained no material
advance in their living conditions in forty-plus years.
Despite this physical stagnation, major social changes were already
underway by the 1880s. Indeed, a far-reaching movement for the Catawbas was
taking root. From first colonization, settlers had been attempting to Christianize
the “pagan” Catawbas. These efforts had met with uniform failure, regardless of
the time, person, or sect.
Christianity and the church had made little progress among the Catawbas.
Dr. Maurice Moore, writing about 1870, says “I was told not too many
years since, by one who had preached to them himself, that though the
Catawbas all understood the English language and missionaries of all
denominations had faithfully preached the Word among them, not one, up
to that time, ever professed conversion and became connected with a
Christian church.148
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This changed abruptly in the early 1880s when Mormon doctrine and
teachings struck a responsive cord among the Catawba people. Within a short
time, a full ninety-five percent of them were actively practicing Mormonism, a
number that has held steady until today.

The appeal of Mormonism to the

Catawba is very revealing. Chief Samuel Taylor Blue (1872-1952) explained as
follows: “They brought a book which is known as the Book of Mormon. This
Book was the direct history of our forefathers which we had no other history of
before this book came along.” Brown notes that Mormonism significantly held
that the American Indians, like the white race, were descendants of the lost tribes
of Israel. As members of these chosen people, the Catawbas had standing above
non-Israelite peoples, specifically the black race. The separation from blacks and
the unity with the whites in God’s selected peoples was the answer to their
tenuous position in a biracial society. Here was a religion that answered and
ordained the Catawbas’ position, one that had been amorphous since the coming
of the white man. Brown notes that “Telling them that they were descendants of
the lost tribes of Israel gave them a place—and a respectable place—among the
peoples of the world.”
Anthropologist Frank Speck noted the uniqueness of this phenomenon.
The case of the Catawba is indeed a peculiar one in this respect…the only
instance among American tribes known to us where conversion to the
religion of the white man shifted a whole group from paganism to
Christianity in the Mormon path.149
Mass religious conversion in a people who had resisted Christianity lends
support to Hudson’s and Merrell’s theories about the Catawbas’ racial dilemma
and their desire to be identified with whites only. The component of Mormonism
that appealed to the Catawbas was the oneness with whites as superior to blacks,
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and even become a part of the anointed peoples and could even achieve
“whiteness.” George L. Hicks argues that an enthusiastic embrace of Mormonism
follows naturally, even logically, from the findings of Hudson and Merrell.
When Mormon missionaries visited the reservation in 1883 or 1884, the
Catawba were introduced to an ideology of race that promised them
mobility. With their acceptance of Mormonism, the Catawba obtained the
highest sanction of those beliefs about Negro inferiority that were already
well-established in the tribe. The two race ideologies, Mormonism and
the Catawba of Southern racism fitted together without contradiction.
Both considered the Negroes “an idle people, full of mischief,” and
forbade intermarriage with them. Mormonism added the agreeable notion
that American Indians were one day to join Caucasians in the upper
stratum.150
The 1880s also saw a concerted effort by the Catawba Nation to finally
secure a settlement and remuneration for the vast lands surrendered in 1840.
South Carolina had never paid for the land it had seized. The Catawba Chief at
that time was Thomas Morrison, who continued the new Catawba technique of
applying a more personal and direct approach. The Rock Hill Herald reported on
January 13, 1887, that Chief Morrison, along with Benjamin and William Harris,
had gone directly to Columbia seeking a settlement of the Nations Ford Treaty of
1840. And this time they were accompanied by legal counsel. Attorney J. Q.
Marshall had been retained and went with the Harris brothers.151

But the

Catawbas received no satisfaction in spite of repeated appeals by Nation
representatives directly to the Governor and the South Carolina Legislature.
Approximately ten years later, these frustrating efforts at redress reached a
new level. This time, as in the attempts at resettlement west before the Civil War,
the Catawba bypassed South Carolina and appealed directly to the Federal
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government. The case for restitution came from a total of two hundred and fifty
seven Indians of Catawba heritage living in the Creek and Choctaw lands of the
Indian Territories and in western Arkansas. They were the descendents of those
Catawbas who had moved themselves west in the 1850s. Meeting at Fort Smith,
Arkansas, they had formed the Catawba and Non-reservation Indian Association,
and sent a Memorial stating their case to the United States Congress.
Their memorial declared that they were the members and the descendants
those who had been members of the Catawba tribe of the Carolinas. Under the
provisions of the Indian Removal Act of 1848, they had come west where the
Federal Government had promised them new homes and land, but had granted
neither.

Consequently these Catawbas had been stranded in the Choctaw

Territory and forced to seek livelihood without any land upon which they could
build homes for themselves and their families. The succeeding generations as a
result were
in great need, and are very anxious to be given lands, homes, or allotments
in any of the lands that they are now or that may hereafter become
available for that purpose in the Indian Territory or the Oklahoma
Territory…and (are) entitled to receive in right, justice, or equity from the
United States…new homes in the West or their lands in the East…and that
such action be taken in their behalf.
Congress referred this matter for further investigation to the Department of
the Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs. In April 1888, Interior Commissioner D.
M. Browning ruled that
the Catawba Indians held their lands in South Carolina, under agreements
or arrangements made with that State over which the Federal Government
had no control or jurisdiction.” 152
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Thus the Catawbas’ struggle for settlement of the Nations Ford Treaty was still
being shifted between the Federal and South Carolina governments more than
fifty years later. Nothing had changed.
The Catawba Nation, born of the union of diverse, fragmented tribes of
Southeastern Indian fragments uniting under them, had undergone, in turn, its
own scattering. Like other peoples before and after them, the Catawba have
experienced their own diaspora across the United States. This dispersion began in
the 1840s with the retreat to North Carolina and the Cherokees, then to settlement
with the Choctaws and other tribes in the Indian Territories. It slowly resumed
after the Civil War. Often these dispersions occurred in family groups, and they
emigrated for personal reasons.

The locations they chose were varied and

numerous, not just to other Indian lands. Civil War veteran Alexander Timms
emigrated to Colorado in 1883, followed by the family of Private Robert Head.
Head’s descendents moved from there to other states, especially Arizona and New
Mexico.153 Many Catawbas moved to Utah in the wake of the conversion to
Mormonism. A century later, there were about fifteen hundred persons living in
approximately twenty states who could claim Catawba heritage. Most recently
this trend has begun to reverse, with tribal members moving back to the
Carolinas, attracted by better economic opportunities and renewed interest in their
Indian heritage.
Across the South in the decades following the Civil War there occurred an
outpouring of remembrance and pride in the Confederacy and its heroic veterans.
These paeans took various forms, from monuments to parades, holidays to
literature, and social clubs for those who served and also for their families.
Multiple events and organizations attempted to keep alive the spirit of those times
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and the people who had created it. The people of York and Lancaster Counties
were active participants in this celebratory and memorial process.

We have

already seen two instances of this movement. Both McCrady’s talk at Walhalla
about the heroics of Gregg’s Brigade at Second Manassas, and McMaster’s
spirited defense, at Chester, South Carolina, of Elliott’s Brigade at the Battle of
the Crater were presented at CSA Company reunions.

In both instances,

celebration was mixed with attempts at “correction.”
In the heady days after General Wade Hampton’s successful 1876
campaign for Governor of South Carolina, and the subsequent ouster of the
Radicals of Reconstruction, there was a marked increase in homage to the
Confederacy and its ideals. The Catawba Rifles of Rock Hill, one of a score of
like-minded organizations across the South, was formed to provide a social format
for these celebrations. Although technically a unit in the State Militia, its main
purpose appears to have been to sustain and honor the Confederate military
tradition. The fellowship of these organizations is captured by a 1903 article in
the Rock Hill Journal.
The Catawba Rifles have accepted an invitation to the military picnic to be
given at Cornwell, S.C. Thursday, September 3rd. They will leave here at
10:45 and return that evening at 7:30 thus have a day’s outing of eight
hours, a good dinner, and the pleasure of renewing acquaintances made at
the encampment at Columbia.154
Indeed, according to Brown, the Rifles held a military ball every year.
She quotes from one account:
The evening of May 14, 1885, was a gala occasion for the military in Rock
Hill and was long remembered as a time of much enjoyment and pleasure.
The afternoon was set apart for the inspection of the Catawba Rifles by
General Manigault. At six o’clock the battalion was formed on Main
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Street under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. H. White, of the
Palmetto Regiment, and the line marched…
At nine o’clock that night Roddey’s Hall, which had been tastefully and
appropriately decorated for the occasion, was thrown open and an
assemblage of fair women and brave men soon gathered, and at ten
o’clock the ball presented a brilliant scene.155
There was no mention of any Catawbas in the Catawba Rifles, nor were any
mentioned in the records of those attending any of these celebratory
commemorative events.
In similar manner, the Original Roll of Membership for the Catawba
Camp # 278, United Confederate Veterans Association, Rock Hill, South
Carolina, lists one hundred and six former soldiers as charter members. They
were primarily from the Carolinas, but also Arkansas, Alabama, and Georgia.
However, no actual Catawba veterans were members of the Catawba Lodge of the
United Confederate Veterans Association.156
Indeed, there is a sharp contrast between the inclusion of white and Indian
CSA veterans in these events and organizations. The vast majority of Catawba
soldiers were not asked to be a part of the honoring celebrations.

Blumer

mentions that Alexander Tims, in 1880, attended his company’s reunion,157 but he
does not cite his source for this statement and there is no confirmation in a
newspaper or in a contemporary account. Probably more significant is the denial
to them of any fellowship and help for any psychological effects that certainly
were a part of the combat experience. If the Catawbas attempted this healing
comradeship, they apparently did it in isolation among themselves.
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But tangible benefits associated with the Lost Cause movement were
available to the Catawbas. South Carolina was among the states of the former
Confederacy to initiate pension benefits for their Civil War veterans and their
spouses. A limited relief effort commenced in 1888. Subsequently coverage was
expanded twice. By then there were only two surviving Catawba widows to
benefit from pension supplements. Nancy Harris, now 70, and Sarah Harris, 65,
were officially listed as beneficiaries by the South Carolina Comptroller General
in 1901. Both their husbands had served in Company H, 12th South Carolina
Volunteers. Eight years later only Sarah Harris survived, receiving a monthly
pension of $19.75.158
Additionally, South Carolina had started an artificial limb replacement
program for amputees in 1867, and continued it for forty years. Approximately
three hundred approved prosthesis applications survive, and they were collected
into a book by Patrick J. McCawley, an archivist with the South Carolina
Department of Archives and History. No Catawba soldiers are listed among the
recipients.159
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, an unusual phenomenon
occurred in the Rock Hill-Fort Mill area. Of their own initiative the citizens there
erected a monument to their neighbors, the Catawba people.

Prominently

featured on this memorial were the names of the Indian soldiers who had fought
and died for the Confederacy. Another side had plaques commemorating the
Catawbas who had always aided the white settlers and who had served in the
Revolutionary War.

This limestone and brass-plated obelisk was placed

alongside three other monuments. Those erected previously honored the other

158

Blumer, Bibliography of the Catawba, 216, 237-239.
Patrick J. McCawley, Artificial Limbs for Confederate Soldiers (Columbia: South Carolina
Department of Archives and History, 1992).
159

90

Southerners: Confederate veterans, women, and the slaves. All had been placed
in the 1890s, with the cresting of the memorial movement. Again, the only
commemoration of the Catawba soldiers sacrifice came from their neighbors, the
citizens of York and Lancaster Counties.
The Catawba Memorial was dedicated on July 31, 1900, with a large
gathering in attendance. The Columbia State was there and reported the day’s
events.

A portion of that article directly addressed the fifty Catawbas who

attended the ceremony:
And Ben Harris, a son of John Harris, one of the bravest members of the
Twelfth South Carolina, delivered the speech. The speech was written by
him and is a specimen of what an Indian can do.
The Indians were given a fine dinner and deported themselves well…Ben
Harris, son of Confederate veteran, then spoke.
He said (that) the Catawbas never took part against him (the white man)
but helped him in all life, in all wars, in the Revolution, and when they
sent 20 braves to the Civil War…If the white man had done the Indian
justice…a good many of them would have been educated and able to make
a good speech.160
Even at this ceremony honoring and remembering the faithful Catawba
Nation, the stereotype of Indians as primitive and inferior comes through for the
writer, just as it did for the New York Times editorial writer forty years previously.
What was notably different was the change that had occurred in the Catawbas in
the interval. That new assertiveness is apparent in Ben Harris’s address. His
pointed and public admonishment for the failure of the whites to respond to the
Catawba sacrifices, and the consequences to his people of those broken promises
and trust, was a timely example of this awakening.
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This post-war experience of both the Catawba soldiers and the tribe as a
whole contrasted sharply with that of other North and South Carolina Indian
peoples. This historiographical examination shows the uniqueness of the total
Catawba commitment to South Carolina’s course in the Civil War. Unlike the
Catawbas, whose Civil War military support failed to change South Carolina’s
treatment of them, North Carolina acted quickly to recognize the Civil War
support of the Eastern Band Cherokees.

Its General Assembly formally

recognized the Cherokees’ right to North Carolina residency on February 19,
1866. Their act declared “That the Cherokee Indians who are now residents of
the State of North Carolina, shall have the authority and permission to remain in
the several counties of the State where they now reside; and shall be permitted to
remain permanently therein so long as they may see proper to do, any thing in the
treaty of eighteen hundred and thirty-five to the contrary not withstanding.”161
The last part referred to the Treaty of New Enchota. This right had never been
specifically affirmed by North Carolina, leaving tribal members in limbo as far as
being able to stay in their homelands if they so desired.
Two significant factors, however, were markedly absent from this
reassurance. Actual citizenship and its rights was not a part of North Carolina’s
declaration. Secondly, at this time disease epidemics, ruined farmland, and lack
of food and clothing caused the tribal members to fall into a demoralized
factionalism. They were continuing to keenly experience all the depravations of
war. They required urgent assistance, not a vague, even if welcomed, reassurance
about being able to stay. Fortunately a new advocate now assumed Thomas’
former role. Headsman George Busheyhead applied to North Carolina for a
permanent reservation and the needed assistance. Refused, he then turned his
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efforts to the Federal Indian agencies. Officials there responded that the Eastern
Band Cherokee were North Carolina’s responsibility, even without citizenship.
Instead these administrators again raised the possibility of removal and thus
Federal stewardship. Thirty years after avoiding the 1830s push for removal, the
specter of forced relocation became a distinct possibility once again for the
Eastern Band Cherokees. The Fourteenth Amendment gave citizenship to anyone
born in the United States and under its jurisdiction. The 1868 North Carolina
Constitution granted the right to vote to anyone born in the United States, over
twenty-one years old, and a resident of the state for at least a year. Despite these
measures, Cherokee status concerning North Carolina citizenship and rights
remained murky. Busheyhead persisted in Washington until Congress finally
recognized the North Carolina Cherokee as a distinct tribe on July 27, 1868. The
Eastern Band Cherokee were now under Federal protection and support.
Discussions of removal turned to finding a permanent reservation. (By marked
contrast, the Catawbas gained United States citizenship in 1934, and Federal
recognition as a distinct tribe in 1943-1944.)162 For the Cherokee, it took an
additional seven years to work through internal conflicts, Federal and state
bureaucracy, and the settlement of outside land claims before their Quallatown
home area became the Qualla Boundary Reservation in 1875. Additional lands
were added over the next five years. The title to the Reservation was vested in the
Eastern Band in common and was unalienable except by the consent of both the
Cherokee Council and President.163
The Eastern Band Cherokee were active participants in the Lost Cause
commemorative associations and activities that bracketed the decades at the turn
of the twentieth century.
162
163

Cherokee veterans formed the United Confederate

Merrell, The Catawbas, 95-97.
John R. Finger, The Eastern Band of the Cherokees, 122-125.

93

Veterans in 1900. Its name was later changed to honor Sou-noo-kee, a Cherokee
Confederate soldier killed at Cumberland Gap in defense of their mountain
homeland.

Multiple photographs exist showing the Cherokee at reunions of

Confederate veterans.
The Lumbee Indians of the coastal North Carolina area experienced a
Reconstruction period markedly different than North Carolina’s Cherokees. The
Lowry guerrilla group did not cease fighting after assisting Sherman. Military
hostilities ended in 1865 but the Lowry Band continued its paramilitary efforts
against the repression directed at Indians and former slaves under the new white
power structure. Reconstruction lasted until 1875 in North Carolina and their
counteroffensive continued during that decade. The Lowry Band found that their
efforts were necessary to counteract the “new” white racist power structure that
evolved after the Civil War in the South. The Lumbee, like the Catawbas and all
Southeastern Indians, were considered people of color, and deeply and adversely
affected under the emerging force of Jim Crow society.

W. McKee Evans

chronicled this period in his study To Die Game-The Story of the Lowry Band,
Indian Guerrillas of Reconstruction. The racist culture and segregation that arose
in the postwar period necessitated the Lowry Band’s continued challenges to its
repression. “Once a larger political process got underway…The Radical ideas
that once inspired Union soldiers were no longer needed when the antebellum
power had been smashed and a new one established. The Whiggish business
leaders, now as firmly in control of the Republican Party as that party was in
control of the nation, were beginning to develop a queasy feeling about their
earlier commitment to civil rights. One by one they began to lay aside their
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Radical ideas. The Lowrys opposed…the party’s dominant policy of piecemeal
accommodation to the new, avowedly racist southern power structure.”164
The Lowry Band had members other than the Lowrys. Several of the
guerillas were fellow Lumbee and both poor whites and blacks. Escaped Union
POWs from the Florence, South Carolina military prison joined in the insurgent
action. Able to disappear into the region’s swamplands and aided by local black
and Indian communities, they practiced a protective, active and violent resistance.
This significant response, so different than that of the Catawbas, is noted by
Laurence Hauptman:

“Unlike their Indian neighbors the Catawba of South

Carolina, they chose to fight back against a Southern white supremacist order that
surrounded and enslaved them. Indeed, their stance as guerrillas in the Civil War
era separates them from most other Southeastern Indians.”165
In Virginia, a brief window of opportunity to hold public office opened for
the Pamunkey and other Powhatans during Reconstruction. In 1872, Pamunkey
headsman Ferdinand Wynn served for a few months as road supervisor in Tyler
Township, Charles City County.

The Pamunkey also started a cooperative

Reservation store in 1874-75, using money they had received in compensation for
damages as a result of Civil War combat. The Pamunkey Indians who assisted
the Union forces in the Peninsula Campaign were never enlisted sailors or soldiers
in either army; and, therefore, not a part of the memorial and fraternal aspects of
the Lost Cause or the Grand Army of the Republic.
In the 1890s, the Smithsonian Institution became interested in preserving
the culture and language of various Southeastern Indian peoples. James Mooney
and Albert Gatschet were responsible for much of our understanding of the
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Catawbas in this time. Joined by John Garland Pollard, they also visited the
Pamunkey Indians and other Powhatan tribes. Among their findings was the
same antipathy and distancing from the now-former slaves that the Catawbas so
strongly experienced. The Pamunkeys refused to associate with blacks and even
had a tribal law that prohibited blacks from attending the tribal schools and
churches. Pollard notes, “No one who visits the Pamunkey could fail to notice
their race pride. Though they would probably acknowledge the whites as their
equals, they consider the blacks far beneath their social level.”166
The Cherokee Indians who lived within the Indian Territory faced a
unique situation with the end of the Civil War. Technically, they had seceded to
join the Confederacy. Even John Ross and his followers had signed the treaty
with the Confederate States of America before seeking Federal refuge. In the
corridors of Congress many were intent on punishment for the Cherokee. Senator
James Harlan presented a bill to abolish all antebellum Indian treaties and
consolidate all the Civilized Tribes under one government in the Indian Territory.
William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indians under Lincoln, fought this attempt,
citing that without the treaties there would be no Indian right over their land,
leaving the Territory open to anyone. The Harlan Bill passed the Senate on
March 2, 1865, but never reached debate in the House.167
In September 1865, the new Indian Commissioner Dennis N. Cooley
called for a meeting with the Five Civilized Tribes at Fort Smith in present day
Arkansas. There Cooley relayed President Andrew Johnson’s hopes and plans for
a peaceful reunion with the National government, like that of the other
Confederate soldiers. New treaties were to be negotiated to accomplish this goal.
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Caught by surprise and unprepared to negotiate, the Indian representatives signed
an understanding of friendship agreeing to proceed, and repudiated their
Confederate treaties.
During the first half of 1866, treaties were again signed with all five of the
Civilized Tribes. In these new agreements the Indians gave up land parcels to
provide room for other tribes, freed their slaves and pledged to provide for them,
established a general council of all the tribes, and provided for railroad corridors
through the Indian Territory.

For all the Nations except the Cherokee,

reunification was uneasy but relatively uncomplicated, helped by the fact that they
had never split into loyalist and secessionist factions.

The Cherokees’

fundamental schism during the Civil War burdened them with hostile feelings and
memories. Cooley called for further negotiations. At first a split of the Cherokee
Nation into Northern and Southern entities was proposed, but was rejected by
President Johnson. Further compromise finally resulted a treaty with the whole
Cherokee Nation on July 27, 1866, ten days after John Ross died. The unity of
the Cherokee had been secured, although animosity continued for years.168
There are two monuments in Tahlequah, Indian Territory (now
Oklahoma). Tahlequah was the terminus of the Trail of Tears and became the
capital of the Cherokee Nation. One honors John Ross, the Cherokee Principal
Chief throughout the post-removal and Civil War periods. A short distance away
is a memorial to Stand Watie, the Cherokee warrior.
The immediate postwar period for Southeastern Indians was in many
aspects a continuation of their response to the crisis precipitated by the Civil War.
Both the Indian Territory Cherokee and the Eastern Band Cherokee struggled to
heal the wounds of their internal schisms that resulted from their split allegiance.
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There was no such deep division for the Catawbas, the only Southern tribe totally
supportive of the Confederacy. During this time the Eastern Band Cherokees
were rewarded with both North Carolina citizenship (in spite of some members
supporting the North) and also gained Federal tribal status and protection (again
in spite of the remainder serving the Confederacy). Even with no divided loyalty,
the Catawbas achieved neither. They continued their struggle for aid through
petitions and personal lobbying, only to receive less for a once-again growing
tribal family. The Lumbee continued their guerrilla tactics in active resistance to
further persecution force upon them by the racists in power during
Reconstruction. In contrast the Catawbas did not attempt any known resistance to
similar forces in South Carolina. The sharp difference in both the war and
postwar eras between the Catawba and the other tribes would seem to indicate
that the Catawbas had a reason to fully embrace the Confederacy that was not
present for other native peoples. The Lumbee joined former slaves and freedmen
in their paramilitary unit, and blacks that were associated with the Indian
Territory Cherokee would have been slaves. The Catawbas were faced with a
unique racial quandary in the highly charged biracial society of South Carolina.
Their actions were their written word, and their singular response to the Civil War
lends support to the idea that those actions were motivated by the felt need to
separate and distance themselves from what they perceived as the greatest threat
to their survival as a race.
The Catawbas’ continual fight to preserve their self-identity in the rapidly
evolving 19th century society of their homeland is the heart of this thesis. As the
biracial Southern structure coalesced in the 1800s, the Catawbas correctly
perceived that their survival as a distinct people depended on association and
identification with the dominant white faction. Any other status would mean
essential extinction as a people. In the ante-bellum South this involved adopting
98

the white racial orthodoxy, especially distinguishing themselves from the blacks.
Failure to do so would mean permanent exclusion from that new society. As
Brown notes, the Catawbas perception was alarmingly accurate. There definitely
was “a tendency to equate Catawbas with blacks, a tendency that threatened the
very existence of the Nation.”169 They had to do whatever was necessary to
distance themselves from blacks in that racial triangle that had entangled them.
It is deeply ironic that these native people without any inherent prejudice
had to resort to that tactic against a fellow-persecuted group. The Indians and the
blacks actually shared a common condition and fate. Alexis de Tocqueville noted
this in his 1835 Democracy in America. DeTocqueville was studying American
government and politics, which often involved mentioning the role and place of
black and Indian Americans.
These objects, which touch on my subject, do not enter into it; they are
American without being democratic, and above all it is democracy that I
wanted to portray.
These two unfortunate races have neither birth, nor face, nor language, nor
mores in common; only their misfortunes look alike. Both occupy an
equally inferior position in the country they inhabit; both experience the
effect of tyranny; and if their miseries are different, they can accuse the
same authors for them.170
DeTocqueville’s insight was very perceptive. He realized that both black and
Indian Americans shared this exclusion, and he felt neither would ever be able to
effect a change in their condition. The Catawbas appear to have attempted to
steer a middle course, seeking to be associated with whites while at the same time
preserving their distinct identity. The white settlers used both Indian land and
slave labor to build their “new world,” constructing their society on the backs of
169
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both peoples. One can easily understand why the colonists feared a joint uprising
by both. What is surprising, and indeed ironic, is the Catawbas’ deep antipathy
toward their fellow sufferers. This is tellingly indicative of the force of the racial
paradigm.
In a real sense, religion served post-war in the Catawbas’ continuing
efforts to be identified with the white-dominant social power base.

The

hypothetical question of where the Catawbas would have served if there had been
black units in the CSA is very thought provoking. Given the long, visceral history
of Southern fear of armed slave uprisings, active colored military service for the
blacks was a moot point in the Confederacy. What is significant is that the
Catawbas, always loyal warriors except during the Yamasee War, were entrusted
with arms and munitions. But that remarkable difference from the slaves did not
prevent their exclusion from significant aspects of white society.
Elements of paternalism were operative in the Catawba-white Carolina
relationship. The personal nature of paternalism as described by Genovese was
very influential in the prewar and Civil War years. If not for the efforts of many
local York County citizens, the Indian agents, certain governors, and others like
David Hutchison, the tribe would have been totally abandoned after 1840. The
Catawbas were also able to partially counteract the self-destructive nature of the
paternalism they encountered. Genovese emphasizes the temporizing effect of
religion for the slaves:

“The slaves forged weapons of defense, the most

important of which was a religion that taught them to love and value each other,
to take a critical view of their masters, and to reject the ideological rationales for
their own enslavement.”171 The Catawbas kept their sense as a distinct people
through the memory and emphasis of their Nationhood and strong warrior past.
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Their proud history seems to have served the same function as religion did for the
slaves. Unlike the slaves, they had a significant past of power and culture in
South Carolina. This served as mitigating and protective value for the Indians
during this period.
Christianity was not the central unifying force during the struggle as it was
for the slaves. In a real sense, religion served in the Catawbas’ continuing postwar efforts with the dominant white social-power base.
Mormonism gave the American Indians a special place. The Book of
Mormon purported to be an account of the Indians’ ancestors. It predicted
that they could become “a white and delightsome people” if they accepted
church teaching. At the same time, Mormon scripture said that those upon
whom “the Lord God did cause a skin of blackness to come” were “an idle
people, full of mischief.” Thus to the Catawbas the Mormon doctrine
encouraged their efforts to distance themselves from blacks while at the
same time supporting their desire to become more like whites, a course
they had already been following for years.172
For the Catawbas, after centuries of total resistance to white missionaries, to
suddenly and totally embrace a religion, it must have spoken to a deeply felt need.
This acceptance by the vast majority of the tribe supports Merrell’s contention
that learned racial attitudes from whites underpinned their response to the
upheaval thrust upon them in the 1800s. The Catawbas’ solution was a byproduct
of and the most significant factor in their adaptation to their changing condition
during this period.
Another aspect of paternalism helps in understanding why the Catawbas
supported the Confederacy with their lives. In their long relationship with South
Carolina a mutual bond had formed, analogous to that of the slaves and masters
described by Genovese:

“A paternalism accepted by both masters and

slaves…afforded a fragile bridge across the intolerable contradictions inherent in
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a society based on racism, slavery, and class exploitation.”173

Substitute

“Catawbas” for “slaves” and that implicit bond gives insight into the Indians’
seemingly unfathomable actions of support throughout 1861-1865.
Of course, the Nation from colonial times had always associated with the
whites. This too had been their initial, intuitive response long before the cottonslave economy of the 1800s. This tradition of military aid to the white society
was extended with their Civil War service. That loyalty would appear to be a
separate impulse and not related to racial issues. The evolving racial society
spurred efforts to enhance these established bonds with the whites. With the
coming of the Secession crisis, the Catawbas’ long tradition of support for the
white government fused with the more recent search for identity in the new
racially-charged order. The result was their Confederate service that initially
appears so mysterious and incomprehensible.
This thesis began with the idea of exploring the rationale and course of the
Catawba military service to the Confederacy. That vision expanded as the study
clearly showed that their Civil War experience was only a part of the significant
changes that the Catawbas experienced between 1840 and 1890. The profound
reshaping of their lives endured by the Catawba people in these years is
comparable to their other watershed period of 1670-1770, when they were
decimated by war and disease. In addition to their struggle to remain a distinct
people, the Catawbas also endured the continuous conflicts of race in a new
society, as well as their emergence as a people with their own voice, religion and
diaspora.

In each period they were threatened with marginalization, even

extinction. Exploring their responses and motivations has made for a rewarding
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study that lends insight into a unique element in the history of South Carolina, the
South, and the United States.
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